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ABSTRACT 
This research starts with two questions of whether and why China regarded the New 1997 
Defense Guidelines (NDG) as a national threat. To answer the first question, this research 
analyzes and categorizes Beijing’s responses to the NDG. The result of the analysis 
suggests that the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, which tried to strengthen their 
national security, conversely caused Beijing’s suspicion and led China to react 
diplomatically and militarily. Given Tokyo’s action and Beijing’s reaction, these two 
states were sinking into the spiral model of a security dilemma. 
To find the answer of the second question, this thesis uniquely combines two 
theoretical perspectives—Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat approach and Alexander 
Wendt’s constructivist theory. Given that Japan has not revealed its aggressive 
intentions—considering Tokyo’s upholding a 1 percent norm of the defense budget—
since the end of World War II, Walt’s realist logic cannot persuasively explain why 
China perceived that the NDG was the outcome of Japanese aggressive intention. To 
supplement Walt’s logic, this research uses Wendt’s perspective. As a result, the Chinese 
fear about a militarizing Japan has persisted and affected Beijing’s negative interpretation, 
which because of Tokyo’s aggressive intentions for the resurgence of its militarism, 
produced the NDG. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States continues to recognize that China’s rise may potentially 
threaten its hegemony in East Asia. Additionally, the escalation of the territorial dispute 
between China and Japan over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands has increased Japan’s 
efforts to protect its national security by strengthening its alliance with the United States. 
These two countries’ consensus on their national self-interests has accelerated the 
revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance and created “the New 1997 Defense Guidelines 
for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation” (NDG).1 The creation of these guidelines, on the 
other hand, has raised diplomatic concerns for the People’s Republic of China (PRC); 
Beijing feels that the purpose of the alliance is to check or contain PRC’s rise.2 
In regard to the causal relations between a refinement of the U.S.-Japanese 
alliance and the Chinese perception of it, this research asks whether the NDG would be 
the one of factors that intensifies the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Furthermore, the 
thesis also focuses on why the NDG, which encompasses various degrees of military and 
diplomatic U.S.-Japanese cooperation, has increased China’s mistrust and uncertainty 
over Japan’s intentions. If the NDG has intensified Beijing’s mistrust and doubt, one 
concludes that the NDG is the one catalyst for intensifying the Sino-Japanese security 
dilemma. The principal hypothesis of the thesis will explore whether the NDG has in fact 
promoted, rather than dampened, Chinese distrust of Japan’s intentions with regard to the 
major issues that divide them, including unresolved territorial disputes over the 
Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands and the PRC’s “One-China policy” toward Taiwan. 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “THE GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE 
COOPERATION,” MOFA: The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, December 13, 2013, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html. 
2 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance,” Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (1997): 384. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
This research is especially valuable when considering the mutually hostile Sino-
Japanese relations, which include the escalating conflict over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai 
islands and the anxiety that each has expressed about the growing military power of the 
other. Moreover, the current literature takes insufficient account of Japan as a regional 
actor, and is too willing to take Sino-American hostility for granted. Given the narrow 
and fragmentary approaches of previous studies, one cannot deduce a convincing answer 
in regard to the fundamental reasons for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. As a result, 
the outcome of this thesis on how and why strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance has 
led Beijing to feel suspicious can be a useful foundation to analyze the action-reaction 
process in international relations and predict the upcoming conflicts of East Asia. 
Furthermore, previous studies depended mainly on speeches of eminent scholars 
and politicians to analyze the Chinese concerns over the NDG. In this regard, the 
outcome of previous studies cannot sufficiently provide a persuasive answer to the main 
research question of this thesis. To supplement the lack of previous studies’ explanatory 
power, this thesis will analyze more objective and measurable data to determine whether 
the NDG could intensify the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Moreover, the perspectives 
of realist Stephen M. Walt and constructivist Alexander Wendt, as theoretical tools of the 
thesis, complementarily shed light on why the NDG would be one of the factors to lead 
China and Japan to fall into the security dilemma’s spirals of tension. In this regard, the 
outcome of this research will test the analytic value of realism and constructivism for 
evaluating Sino-Japanese relations.  
In terms of the effect of the NDG, some scholars ascribe the acceleration of a 
security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations to a mutual mistrust of the anarchic 
international system. Furthermore, previous studies maintain that strengthening the U.S.-
Japan alliance made the Chinese feel intensely threatened given the desire to protect their 
national interests. Their main threats are as follows: triggering a remilitarization of Japan, 
deterring a rising China, and obstructing a China-Taiwan reunification. These Chinese 
threats will be the background to deduce the essential reasons that the NDG may have 
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stimulated China’s security anxiety and how that heightened anxiety may influence 
Chinese policy. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS  
For the United States, managing the U.S.-China-Japan triangle has been essential 
for maintaining the status quo in East Asia. In this respect, the PRC is more likely to 
regard the NDG as an extension of the U.S. deterrence strategy towards China. As Joseph 
Nye asserted in 1996, “China’s cautious optimism about trends in the U.S.-Japan alliance 
turned to pessimism, as concerns about future Japanese military assertiveness grew 
rapidly.”3 Hence, the Chinese took the close U.S.-Japanese relationship seriously and as 
a big burden to its national security. At the same time, as Banning Garrett and Bonnie 
Glazer have observed, “Beijing judges its interests as best served by a U.S.-Japanese 
relationship that is neither too tense and unraveling, nor growing too strong and 
expanding.” 4  Hence, the Chinese perspectives on the U.S.-Japan alliance include a 
delicate strategic intention. In short, Beijing regards not only U.S.-Japanese security 
cooperation as a necessary condition to prevent Japan from expanding its military power, 
but also conversely their too close relationship as a strategic burden. 
This research hypothesizes that, if Chinese perceived the NDG as a national threat, 
Beijing would likely push forward by preparing national countermeasures against it. 
Furthermore, if the NDG also sparked Chinese mistrust over Japan’s intentions, one 
would expect to see noticeably accelerated Chinese military or diplomatic responses 
against it, a characteristic enactment of the security dilemma dynamic described by Jervis, 
and one that, unless interrupted by new measures, can be expected to evolve in a self-
fulfilling “spiral of tension.”  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review categorizes the Chinese threats over the NDG; this can be a 
useful basis to analyze why and how the NDG would be one of the catalysts that 
                                                 
3 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 
International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 61.  
4 Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 385. 
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exacerbated Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, the following review builds the 
theoretical background that can deduce why a state perceives another state’s action as a 
national threat by applying two branches of realist and constructivist perspectives. This 
also discusses how various variants of realism and constructivism complementarily 
provide a persuasive explanation for determining the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
1. The Chinese Perspectives on the New 1997 Defense Guidelines 
In regard to the Chinese perspectives on the NDG, many scholars agree that China 
regards the NDG as a national threat. Several scholars have dealt with the Chinese 
perspectives on the NDG, and this thesis categorizes them into three major threats: the 
trigger of remilitarizing Japan, the deterrent of a rising China, and the obstruction of 
China-Taiwan reunification. The previous studies included divergent Chinese perceptions 
on the NDG, and demonstrated the Chinese uncertainty of the U.S. and Japanese strategic 
purpose. The previous studies mainly concentrated on comments of scholars and political 
leaders on the implications of the NDG for China’s national security. Even though the 
previous studies do not provide a consensus on Chinese perspectives over the NDG, they 
can be a useful reference to categorize the Chinese view.   
a. The Trigger for Remilitarizing Japan 
In the first category, some scholars claim that enormous Chinese criticism of the 
NDG came from their fear that the United States would no longer contain Japan’s 
expansionism. As Paul Midford argues, China’s complicated strategic goals reflect the 
Chinese response to Japan’s expanded role under the NDG. China needs an efficient 
means of deterrence to prevent Japanese expansionism. China also regards the continued 
and strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance as one of Japan’s strategies directed toward the 
right of collective self-defense. However, as Garrett and Glaser maintain, after the United 
States and Japan signed the NDG, “many Chinese analysts and commentators predict[ed] 
that if the NDG were modified to allow for regional wartime cooperation, there would be 
new pressure in Japan to accept the right of collective self-defense.”5 According to 
                                                 
5 Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 388. 
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Garrett and Glaser’s assertion, the Chinese suspicion of Japan’s intentions has persisted 
in their subconscious due to the Japanese army’s historical precedent.6   
According to the realist scholar Paul Midford, a clear theme in China’s reactions 
to the NDG has been the fear that it might weaken the containment function of the 
alliance and promote Japanese strategic independence. 7  He explains the inevitable 
Chinese threats by applying the balance of threat theory. In short, Midford draws a 
correspondence between Beijing’s extreme sensitivity toward the Japanese behaviors, and 
the Chinese occupation experience.8 Similarly, Renmin Ribao argues that the NDG, 
which promotes U.S.-Japan military cooperation, would be “an important means” for 
strengthening “the seed of Japanese militarism.”9 As Ribao argues, Chinese scholars tend 
to speculate that Tokyo’s strategic purpose arises from the Sino-Japanese historical 
tragedy—the 1900s Japanese invasion of Manchuria.  
b. The Deterrent to a Rising China 
Another category of the Chinese threats from the NDG is the implication that the 
United States will aggregate its power in East Asia. As the Chinese scholar Chen 
Zhijiang asserts, strengthening the U.S.-Japanese security coordination gives the feeling 
that the two countries “work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region.”10 In this 
regard, as Dennis V. Hickey argues, the United States could send China a strong signal 
that “the United States is now better positioned to handle any conflict in East Asia” by 
joining the NDG.11 In short, even if the NDG did not mean a tremendous change in U.S. 
or Japanese policy, strengthening the military collaboration between Washington and 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 392.  
7 Paul Midford, “China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?” 
International Relations of the Asian-Pacific 4, no.1 (2004): 127.  
8 Ibid., 132. 
9 Zhao Jieqi, “‘Redefinition’ of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and its Repercussions,” Waijiao 
Jikan, no. 41 (1996): 36. 
10 Chen Zhijiang, “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security—A Dangerous Signal,” Guangmin 
Ribao, April 18, 1996. 
11 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “The Revised U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines: Implications for 
Beijing and Taipei,” Issues and Studies 34, no. 4 (1998): 88‒89. 
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Tokyo has inevitably prompted Chinese mistrust and suspicion in the anarchic 
international system 
As a detailed means for the U.S. power aggression, the Japanese scholar Kori J. 
Urayama argues that the essential goal of the NDG is the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in 
the theater missile defense (TMD), which is a main threat to China. As Urayama also 
points out, many Chinese experts expect that “the deployment of an upper-tier, space-
based TMD system in Northeast Asia could nullify China’s strategic leverage.”12 His 
research on China’s perceptions examines why Beijing has considered the U.S.-Japanese 
development of a ballistic missile defense system as undermining its nuclear 
capabilities.13 Therefore, Beijing has regarded the development of TMD—which was an 
essential pledge of the NDG—as a potential threat that can aggregate the U.S. power, and 
neutralize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s nuclear missiles.   
c. The Obstruction of China-Taiwan Reunification 
According to the terms of the NDG, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 
could assist U.S. forces when a cross-strait crisis occurs, which Beijing vociferously 
opposes. As Paul Midford asserts, “the goal of the revised Guidelines closely 
approximates that of parrying the U.S. military strength available in the event of a future 
confrontation between China and Taiwan.”14 Then Premier Li Peng’s declaration that, 
“the Chinese government and the Chinese people can never accept any activity directly 
proposing or hinting obliquely at including Taiwan in the scope of the Japan-U.S. 
security cooperation,” 15  supplements Midford’s argument that the Chinese seriously 
accepted the NDG as a means of obstructing the China-Taiwan reunification.  
As Thomas J. Christensen argues, the importance of the Taiwan issue in Chinese 
calculations about the NDG would likely exacerbate Sino-Japanese relations. 16  He 
                                                 
12 Kori J. Urayama, “Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for 
Japan,” Asian Survey 40, 4 (2000): 602. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Midford, “China Views the Revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” 126.  
15 Hickey, “The Revised U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines,” 82. 
16 Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 64. 
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argues that in terms of cross-strait relations, the Chinese consider traditionally defensive 
weapons, such as TMD, crucial to U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the guidelines. In the 
hands of Taiwan, and any of its potential allies, the TMD could be dangerous; the TMD 
could reduce China’s ability to threaten the island with ballistic missile attack.17 
2. The Security Dilemma and the Divergence of the Realist Views on 
World Politics 
This thesis takes the security dilemma as a main concept. The concept describes a 
prevalent phenomenon of an anarchic international system: state A wants to reinforce its 
power or security in order to survive in anarchy, which conversely makes state B feel it is 
threatened and leads state B to counteract the other’s action. Most realist theories assume 
that self-interested states struggle for power in an anarchic international system and begin 
with this security dilemma spiral model. As Stephen M. Walt points out, realism is not a 
single theory; it has considerably diverged into classical and neorealist theory.18  
Different perspectives of offensive and defensive realists can provide a useful 
theoretical background to suggest why the NDG would be one of the catalysts that 
worsens the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. In fact, each variant of realism can present 
a different explanation for Sino-Japanese relations because of these variants’ dissimilar 
views on the state’s nature. In this regard, given the different assumptions of each realist 
variant, one can conclude that the different assumptions of the representative neorealist 
scholars—John J. Mearsheimer, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Stephen M. Walt—
complementarily throw the most light on the reason for the Sino-Japanese security 
dilemma.  
In respect to explanatory power of Mearsheimer, Waltz, and Walt, one must 
acknowledge that each scholar’s view has relative, logical cogency. Therefore, a 
dichotomous assessment, such as which explanation among offensive and defensive 
realism is more rational, cannot provide a productive outcome. This is because these two 
branches of realism build on a different basic assumption regarding the state’s nature; 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 65.  
18 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 
(1998): 31.  
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furthermore, it is almost impossible to determine which hypothesis is correct. 
Nevertheless, one can evaluate which argument between Waltz and Walt has more 
explanatory power because these two scholars, unlike Mearsheimer, share the basic 
“defensive realist” assumptions regarding state’s nature—a state inevitably endeavors to 
protect its security, rather than maximize its power due to uncertainty over other states’ 
intentions. Therefore, this literature review first presents why China fears the NDG’s 
strategic implication by applying Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. Then, this discussion 
determines why Walt rather than Waltz provides a better explanation for analyzing the 
Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
a. Understanding the Security Dilemma 
The realist literature argues that the security dilemma resulted from the anarchy of 
the international system. In this anarchic structure, states inevitably doubt other states’ 
intentions to protect their national security. Therefore, the realism perspective on world 
politics and security dilemma serves a persuasive foundation for why the NDG 
aggravated China’s suspicions about Japan and led both countries to sink into the security 
dilemma spiral model. In this regard, previous research related to the Sino-Japanese 
security dilemma concentrated on how a state contributes to an adversary state’s reaction 
in an anarchic world. Most realist researchers argue that strengthening the U.S.-Japanese 
cooperation intensified China’s fear for protecting its national security and consequently 
led to the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
Robert Jervis’ article, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” is one of the 
most famous works in international relations literature. In an extension of realism, he 
argued about the fundamental assumptions of the international system. As Jervis argues, 
the security dilemma is an essential factor to determine why a pursuit of security 
protection between states inevitably leads to the outbreak of war. A security dilemma 
occurs when “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease 
the security of others.”19 This rational argument includes the “spiral model,” which can 
explain how the states’ interactions of security protection promote competition and 
                                                 
19 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 169. 
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pressure in political relations.20 In this regard, Jervis’ argument builds on realism, as 
mentioned earlier, shedding light on why Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its national 
security conversely led Beijing to counteract the Japanese security actions.   
In Jervis’ definition, a security dilemma occurs when the means by which a state 
tries to increase its security, decreases the security of others.21 If this is correct, why is 
the security dilemma bad for a state’s security? One can find the answer to this question 
in the action-reaction process between states. For example, state A’s action is likely to 
affect state’s B’s decrease in security. By the same logic, state B’s action will in turn 
reduce state A’s security. In short, the continuing action-reaction process between states 
eventually makes both states’ security unchangeable, or worse off than before a state’s 
initial action.22 Consequently, given the infinite action-reaction process of the security 
dilemma, a state’s action, which makes its adversary states less secure, finally comes 
back as a self-defeating result. 
In terms of the security dilemma of Sino-Japanese relations, Thomas J. 
Christensen proposed that strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance promoted Beijing’s 
mistrust over Japan’s military purpose; it inevitably lead to a security dilemma in Sino-
Japanese relations. As he argues, given China’s intense historically-based mistrust of 
Japan, Beijing’s concern about eroding norms of Japanese self-restraint, the political 
geography of the Taiwan issue, and even certain new defensive roles of Japan could be 
provocative to China.23 
Yu-Pan Lee attempted to analyze current Sino-Japanese relations by applying the 
theoretical concept of a security dilemma. Lee used the two characteristics of a security 
dilemma, which Alan Collins revised: an absence of expression of the aggressive 
intention and suspicion over the other’s future intentions.24 For example, Japan needed to 
                                                 
20 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 63.  
21 Ibid., 169.  
22 Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” 175. 
23 Christensen, “China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma,” 80. 
24 Yu-Pan Lee, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations” (master’s thesis, Lingnan 
University, 2009): 167. 
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strengthen its defensive measures to protect its homeland against North Korea’s nuclear 
missiles, but this Japanese military change made China more suspicious of Japan’s 
intentions. Moreover, the Chinese public considers Japan as potentially dangerous and 
thus does not want to cooperate with Japan at all.25 Therefore, China would more likely 
emphasize historical issues and criticize Japanese military efforts, even if these efforts 
were for a purely defensive purpose. In this logic, Sino-Japanese relations would be 
gradually falling into a security dilemma.  
b. John J. Mearsheimer’s View on the Sino-Japanese Security Dilemma 
As John J. Mearsheimer argues, “survival is a state’s most important goal.”26 
This is because the anarchic international system makes states strive to worry about their 
security and compete with each other for power. In this nature of international system, 
every great power endeavors to maximize its power and ultimately become hegemony. 
Mearsheimer also points out that great powers in the modern world cannot achieve global 
hegemony because it is almost impossible to project and sustain power around the 
globe.27 Therefore, great powers strive to gain regional hegemony and prevent other 
great powers of other regions from threatening their status quo.    
Mearsheimer presents three essential characteristics of the international system. 
First, states are main actors in anarchy. Second, all great powers have offensive 
capabilities that can be a useful military means to destroy each other. Third, each state 
cannot know the other state’s intentions, especially the other’s future. Taking 
Mearsheimer’s three assumptions together, the best way for states to survive in anarchy is 
to maximize their power as fully as they can.  
According to the Mearsheimer’s logic, China is more likely to endeavor to 
dominate the Asian region and maximize its power in order to achieve this goal.28 
Moreover, one can inevitably deduce that China and Japan should fall in the security 
                                                 
25 Lee, “The Security Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations,” 167. 
26 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 609 (2006): 160.  
27 Ibid., 161. 
28 Ibid., 162. 
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dilemma spiral model because every great power—China and Japan—wants to maximize 
its power and cannot know the other’s intentions in anarchy. This assumption of 
Mearsheimer suggests why Beijing strongly criticized the NDG’s strategic 
implications—the trigger of remilitarizing Japan, the deterrent of a rising China, and the 
obstruction of China-Taiwan reunification. This is because the NDG itself could play an 
essential role for China as an impediment to gaining regional hegemony.    
In regard to the trigger of remilitarizing Japan, as Mearsheimer argues, China 
wants to make sure that “it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to 
threaten it.”29  Therefore, Beijing should wish that Japan avoids large-scale costs of 
defense and upholds a one percent norm of the defense budget as a militarily weak 
neighbor. However, the NDG provides fertile ground for Japan to strengthen its security 
role in East Asia, because the NDG implies the SDF’s expanded military role, which goes 
beyond the previous logistical support to the U.S. troops. China certainly remembers a 
shameful tragedy of the early twentieth century when they were too weak to counteract 
Japan’s crackdown.   
Mearsheimer predicts that China, in the near term, will strive to unify with 
Taiwan. Moreover, to gain regional hegemony “China will [have to] get Taiwan back.”30 
The NDG, as the U.S.-Japanese agreement that strengthens the U.S. forces’ capabilities 
to intervene in an East Asian crisis, can be an enough of an impediment to thwart the 
accomplishment of China’s hegemony. According to Mearsheimer’s logic, the NDG 
efficiently prevents China from achieving regional hegemony by containing Beijing’s 
attempt at unification by force. Therefore, these strategic implications of the NDG 
provide a sufficient reason for Beijing’s strong opposition.  
c. Balance of Power Theory: Kenneth N. Waltz’s Defensive Realism  
Kenneth N. Waltz presented “the construction of a logically rigorous model of 
international politics;” his “logical coherent analysis” has been a popular and influential 




way to conceptualize the international system.31 Waltz’s concept of the international 
system, which advocated political realism, has provided international politics students 
with an effective model on how the international system has evolved since the end of the 
Cold War and how it will change in the future. According to his arguments, “the 
unintended consequences of interaction” compose an international system.32 For Waltz, 
“human interaction generates organized complexity because social systems develop in 
ways which are often not fully comprehended by members of the system.”33 Waltz points 
out that the international system’s anarchic structure is the fundamental reason for those 
unintended consequences. 
In this anarchic world, states realize that they are unable to maintain unchanged 
allies and they are inevitably exposed to external threats. The states’ dread of unwanted 
consequences simultaneously promotes their “creation of balances of power.” 34 
Moreover, “the distribution of capabilities” among states exemplifies Waltz’s balance of 
power theory.35  Therefore, Waltz’s argument implies the anarchic structure and the 
distribution of capabilities in terms of the international system’s nature. In Waltz’s view 
of the international system, there is no formal central authority, which convincingly 
explains why every sovereign state endeavors to maximize its national security. In this 
inevitable nature of the international system, states’ pursuit of national power as means of 
increasing their relative power to maintain the status quo leads to a security dilemma.  
In regard to the Waltz’s views on nature of the international system, Mearsheimer 
points out that, uncertainty about intentions is the essential difference between his and 
Waltz’s perspective. 36  Mearsheimer agrees with the Waltz’s main assumptions: the 
anarchic international system and the state’s pursuit of survival. However, he argues that 
                                                 
31 Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Neorealism 
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32 Ewan Harrison, “Waltz, Kant, and Systemic Approaches to International Relations,” Review of 
International Studies 28, no. 1 (2002): 148. 
33 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 2nd ed. (Illinois: Waveland Press, 2010), 5.  
34 Ibid., 117.  
35 Ibid. 
36 John J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. 
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Waltz’s logic is wrong unless he additionally assumes that “states can never be certain 
about the intentions of other states.”37 Like Waltz’s hypothesis, if states only seek to 
survive in the anarchic international system, there is no reason why states fear each other. 
This is because not every state needs to worry about the possibility that they will attack 
each other. For this reason, Mearsheimer asserts that there must be the possibility that 
some revisionist states have, or will have, aggressive intentions. Mearsheimer’s two 
assumptions—some revisionist states may have aggressive intentions, and states can 
never be certain about other states’ intentions—convincingly shed light on why states 
inevitably fear each other.  
d. Insufficiency of the Balance of Power Theory on Beijing’s Opposition to 
the 1997 New Defense Guidelines 
According to Kenneth Waltz, a state that is a unitary actor seeks its own 
preservation and drive for universal domination.38 Moreover, states strive to increase 
their capabilities—internal and external efforts—to achieve these ends.39 He argues that 
an external disequilibrium primarily leads other states to intensify their internal and 
external efforts.40 Furthermore, a self-help system, in which any state that does not help 
other states or other less-effective states must be fail to prosper, will expose states to 
danger internationally. 41  Therefore, fear of such “unwanted consequences” strongly 
enables states to pursue “the creation of balances of power.”42 These assumptions by 
Waltz about a state’s nature can convincingly explain the Chinese reaction to the NDG.  
To determine whether China’s opposition came from the power disequilibrium of 
East Asia that resulted from the NDG, one must analyze the strategic implication of the 
revitalization of the U.S.-Japan security alliance after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
For the Beijing side, the U.S.-Japan security alliance had been a valuable means to 
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contain the Soviet security threat. However, the drastic change in East Asia in the 1990s, 
which included the development of Chinese economic and military power and the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union, encouraged a new evaluation of the East Asian power 
structure.  
Given the power structure of East Asia, one could divide it into two categories—
the U.S. and non-U.S. allies, which were sharply different in the Cold War’s two rivalry 
camps. The U.S. and China, in fact, had maintained intimate relationships after both 
countries established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. In this regard, the U.S. 
necessity of counterbalancing to the Soviet and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes 
strongly influenced the U.S. normalization of relations with China. Applying Waltz’s 
theory, China chose the U.S. as a security partner against Soviet power aggression. 
However, the Chinese experienced not only the early-1990s U.S. economic sanctions, but 
also the 1996 U.S. dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to deal with the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis, which made Beijing regard the United States as an obstacle to protecting 
China’s national interest. Therefore, Beijing convincingly realized that the NDG was the 
representative outcome, which revitalized the U.S.-Japan security alliance to protect both 
countries’ status in East Asia. Moreover, China as a non-aligned country must oppose the 
U.S. and Japanese power aggression and strive to balance by increasing internal and 
external efforts.  
As previously determined, China’s fear over the U.S.-Japanese strategic intention 
of the NDG converges in three aspects—the revitalization of remilitarizing Japan, the 
means of deterrence to a rising China, and the obstruction of Sino-Taiwan reunification. 
In regard to the Chinese threats, Waltz’s balance of power theory, which emphasizes a 
self-interested state’s counter balancing against unwanted consequences, can explain why 
Beijing strongly doubted and counteracted the strategic result of NDG—the U.S.-
Japanese containment of a rising China and interference in Sino-Taiwan unification.  
Waltz’s theory, on the other hand, cannot be sufficient to explain the Chinese 
threat toward the Japanese remilitarization. This is because, as Midford argues, “China 
should even favor the Japanese strategic independence” by applying a balance of power 
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theory.43 Furthermore, as Christensen points out, according to the balance of power logic, 
China should be concerned about “coercion by the world’s only superpower, the United 
States,” not the remilitarization of Japan.44 If Japan would be less likely to support the 
United States, it strongly leads the United States, which is China’s most threatening rival 
state, to weaken U.S. military dominance in East Asia. Therefore, a remilitarized Japan as 
an independent security entity implies a potential benefit to China’s security. Furthermore, 
Michael Pillsbury points to “the plausibility of a Sino-Japanese alliance in a balance of 
power world.” He also argues that China must have an open mind about the strategic 
merit which could come from a more strategically independent Japan.45 In this regard, 
Waltz’s balance of power theory is less likely to explain fully why China focuses on the 
possibility that the NDG would trigger the Japanese remilitarization.  
e. Balance of Threat Theory: Stephen M. Walt’s Defensive Realism 
To complement an insufficient explanation of the balance of power theory, this 
thesis will use another defensive realist theory, Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat 
theory. Walt emphasizes a state’s counter balancing not against another’s actual power, 
but a state’s perceived threat. He refines Waltz’s defensive realism by presenting a new 
concept that “states balance against the states that pose the greatest threat.”46 Walt agrees 
with that states unavoidably struggle to maximize their security in an anarchic 
international system. However, Walt’s balance of threat theory points out that states 
strive to form alliances or increase internal power to alleviate their exposed vulnerability 
while Waltz’s balance of power theory argues that states will respond to imbalance of 
power. In short, Walt regards power as one of the components that affects states’ threat 
perception. As shown in Figure 1, one can distinguish between balance of power and 
balance of threat theories. 
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Imbalance of power 







the strongest state 
 
An imbalance of power occurs when the strongest state or coalition in the system 
possesses significantly greater power than the second strongest. Power is the product of 
several different components, including population, economic strength, and military 




Imbalances of threat 






Alliances against the 
most threatening state 
 
An imbalance of threat occurs when the most threatening state or coalition is significantly 
more dangerous than the second most threatening state or coalition. The degree to which a 
state threatens others is the product of its aggregate power, its geographic proximity, its 
offensive capability, and the aggressiveness of its intentions. 
Figure 1.  Balance of power versus balance of threat theory.47 
As Walt presents, states tend to balance against threats, and four components—
aggregate power, proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions—determine the 
level of threat.48 First, aggregate power, as Waltz already presented, is an important 
factor; however, Walt, unlike Waltz, regards it as one of variables that can form states’ 
threat perceptions. In other words, Waltz tries to analyze international politics by using 
only one variable, power aggregation; Walt, on the other hand, considers it as one of 
elements that affects states’ threat perception. Second, one state’s geographic position 
can strongly influence the other states’ strategic decision on how intensely they evaluate 
one state’s military power as a threat to their security stability. Furthermore, a state 
regards the military power of its neighboring states as more threatening than a distant 
state’s military capabilities. Third, the state, that possesses or newly acquires offensive 
capabilities, is more threatening. As Walt points out, “other states are more likely to 
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balance when states with large material resources acquire specialized offensive 
capabilities,” which include not only the military means such as highly mobile, long-
range ballistic missiles, but also the political capacities like a potentially contagious 
ideology.49 Fourth, along with one state’s military capabilities, states emphasize others’ 
aggressive intentions. The accumulated relationships between states determine whether 
one state would be threatening to others. As a result, other states have no justification for 
balancing behavior, which must unnecessarily expend their diplomatic efforts toward a 
benign state.  
3. Constructivist Views on World Politics and the Sino-Japanese 
Security Dilemma 
A well-known constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt, contests the neorealist 
perspective that the nature of the international system as an anarchic structure causally 
leads to a self-help world. He maintains that self-help and power politics are not essential 
characteristics of anarchy, but are institutions that originated from an intersubjective 
process. Moreover, he points out that this process can create a structure of identities and 
interests. Thus, Wendt’s assertion contrasts not only perspectives of classical realists such 
as Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, who focused on human’s willingness to 
dominate, but also those of neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, who 
emphasized an anarchic international structure. The constructivist perspectives of 
Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf can convincingly provide a supplementary explanation 
to determine the fundamental reasons for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
a. Constructivist Views on World Politics 
Wendt’s hypothetical argument focuses on how the intersubjective processes 
between two actors causally create social structures, which are identities and interests. In 
this regard, the independent variable of this theory is the accumulated interactions 
between actors. The process of “signaling,” “interpreting,” and “responding” develops a 
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“social act,” and creates “intersubjective meanings.”50 Furthermore, continuous social 
acts of both sides make each other expect the opponent’s future behavior. If one state 
accumulates sufficient knowledge of the other state, these “reciprocal typifications” 
develop “stable concepts of self and other,” which are dependent variables of this theory. 
In other words, Wendt defines identities and interests as “reciprocal interactions” that 
create enduring “social structures.” 51  Moreover, he presents the model of the 
“codetermination of institutions and process” to determine how reciprocal interaction 
creates competitive or cooperative institutions.52 
Wendt’s constructivism perspective has pragmatic and theoretical implications for 
determining how self-help or a cooperative security system evolves from the interaction 
between states. Therefore, his theoretical approach can explain the security dilemma 
between two states, unlike the realist perspective. Realism theorists point out that states 
are forced to doubt other states’ intentions and competitively must accumulate their 
national power in an anarchic international world. Wendt’s perspective explains that 
when state A repeatedly has felt state B’s acts are menacing, this intersubjective process 
influences the development of state A’s identity and interests, which necessarily creates 
expectations that state B is highly likely to be a threat. Furthermore, if this insecurity 
cognition prevails between the intersubjective understandings of two states, one state’s 
efforts to increase its security inevitably make the other feel that its security is threatened. 
Hence, Wendt’s theory argues that the endogenous process is a fundamental cause of the 
security dilemma in comparison to neorealist theories.  
Ted Hopf defines world politics as a structure that sets “relatively unchangeable 
constraints on the behavior of states.”53 Furthermore, as Hopf points out, constructivism 
provides an alternative theoretical tool, which can replace a number of essential themes in 
international relations, including the meaning of anarchy and balance of power. Like 
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Wendt, Hopf presents that states’ identities can ensure some minimal level of 
predictability and order. 54  Therefore, durable expectations between states, which 
intersubjective processes accumulate, can form a basis for states’ predictable patterns of 
behavior. Hopf’s logic contests not only Mearsheimer’s offensive realism—the nature of 
states, which want to maximize their power, leads them to compete with each other. His 
logic is also at odd with Waltz and Walt’s defensive realism—states strive to increase 
internal and external power for their own security. 
In terms of security dilemmas, Hopf argues that these conflictual relations among 
states are not a product of anarchy.55 This is because some groups of states—members of 
the same alliance, economic institution, and two peaceful states—have not shown 
evidence of a security dilemma. In other words, one must find the central reason for the 
security dilemma in states’ identities, rather than in uncertainty. Following Hopf’s logic, 
uncertainty does not come from an anarchic international system, but from states’ 
perceived identities. The phrase “states understand different states differently” 
sufficiently exemplifies Hopf’s argument.56 In short, if state A perceives state B as an 
aggressor by the process of mutual understandings and habitual practices, state A is likely 
to feel its level of security status is uncertain.  
b. Applying the Constructivist Perspective to the Sino-Japanese Security 
Dilemma 
The theoretical perspectives of Wendt and Hopf are applicable to determine why 
the Sino-Japanese security dilemma has intensified since the United States and Japan 
revitalized their security cooperation. In regard to the NDG, the PRC has continually 
shown strong discontent over Japan’s strategic objectives. In this respect, constructivist 
perspectives may persuasively explain why the U.S.-Japanese effort to enhance security-
threatened China. According to Wendt and Hopf’s assumptions, Chinese distrust toward 
Japan has accumulated since China and Japan began interchanges in various fields of 
activities. Moreover, not only Japanese expansionism in World War II, but also its 
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brutality in the 1937 Nanjing Massacre that killed around 50,000 to 200,000 Chinese, 
generated Chinese hostility and distrust toward Japan.  
Given the Chinese identities and interests that historical legacies produced, the 
PRC may be more likely to regard Tokyo’s behaviors as a result of aggressive intentions. 
Furthermore, the PRC explicitly considered the NDG as a critical threat to the Sino-
Taiwan reunification due to an article of the guidelines that the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces could assist the United States “in the areas surrounding Japan.”57 Moreover, even 
though the 1998 North Korean missile test catalyzed U.S.-Japanese cooperation for 
developing the ballistic missile defense (BMD), China regarded it as a strategic obstacle 
to the Sino-Taiwan reunification.58 This is because the BMD would be a defensive 
weapon of Taiwan against the PLA’s missile capabilities. Hence, Chinese negative 
perspectives toward Japan, which intersubjective processes between both countries had 
accumulated, may have led Beijing to regard Tokyo’s efforts to enhance its security as 
more threatening than the realist security dilemma alone can account for.  
E. MAIN FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 
In regard to the creation of the NDG, analyzing how U.S.-Japanese security 
cooperation has developed since the end of the Cold War would be a useful background 
for deducing changes in the Beijing’s perception. With the dissolution of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), U.S.-Japanese relations changed to adapt a new 
international situation. In January 1992, representatives of the United States and Japan 
met in Tokyo and proposed the establishment of a “global partnership.”59 Even though 
the U.S.-Japanese “global partnership” provided Japan with a more autonomous foreign 
policy, Chinese concerns over the U.S.-Japan alliance scarcely existed. This is because, 
as Garrett and Glaser argue, the Chinese majority forecasted that, “the security 
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relationships will be terminated sometime in the early part of the twenty-first century 
despite the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship in the near term.”60  
In contrast with Beijing’s expectation, the United States and Japan have 
increasingly solidified their cooperation since both countries reconfirmed the importance 
of their security partnership in 1992. In January 1995, the White House announced a joint 
declaration entitled the Global Cooperation Common Agenda (GCCA).61 It meant that 
the United States and Japan could cope with global challenges collaboratively. “In 
November 1995, Japan changed its National Defense Program outline on Japan’s role 
from ‘defense against limited small scale attack’ to support for effective implementation 
of U.S.-Japan security arrangements that respond to situations that arise in the areas 
surrounding Japan.”62 In April 1996, the United States and Japan announced the U.S-
Japan Joint Declaration to increase their security and political cooperation in the region. 
In September 1997, these two nations revised the 1978 Defense guidelines, which were 
the NDG. These included “each partner’s respective role in coordinated responses to 
military conflict in Northeast Asia.” 63  Comparing China’s perception to the U.S.-
Japanese alliance between the early and middle-1990s, one can deduce that the 
solidification of the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation correspondently had been 
increasing Beijing’s suspicion.   
This thesis bases its analytical method on a hypothesis that if China regarded the 
NDG as a national threat, Beijing would make an effort to protect its national interests. 
Moreover, if the Chinese efforts to protect its national security against a threat of the 
NDG existed, as the section of the literature review mentioned, those Chinese actions are 
likely to conversely accelerate Japanese reactions. It means that China and Japan would 
be located in the security dilemma spiral of tension. Therefore, to determine whether the 
NDG worsened a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations, one must find the Chinese 
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responses that come from the logic that states inevitably pursue protection of their 
security.64  
In terms of the Beijing’s responses to the NDG, the thesis sets up the following 
indicators: Beijing’s criticisms, diplomatic effort, and military development against the 
reinforcement of the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. What follows is a description on 
why these three indicators can represent the Chinese reactions.  
First, the Chinese official statements and studies represent their perspectives and 
reflect their perception of threats from the NDG. Moreover, these perceptions determine 
whether the NDG directly or indirectly intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. 
This is because perceptions or misperceptions between states strongly contribute to 
forming and catalyzing the security dilemma.  
Second, as Glenn H. Snyder argues, “a state that is dissatisfied with the amount of 
security it has forms alliances in order to bolster its security.”65 If the NDG provoked the 
Chinese threat perception, then one should identify that Beijing made an effort to 
reinforce its alliance against a threat of NDG. Therefore, the Chinese diplomatic efforts, 
which balance a threat of the NDG, would be a relevant indicator.  
Third, China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which contain 
anti-ship cruise missile, ballistic missile, and submarine forces, and are relevant 
indicators to determine the Chinese military efforts against the U.S.-Japanese security 
cooperation. The Chinese threat from the NDG, as previous studies have indicated, 
converges on a national fear: either the U.S.-Japan alliance, or Japan itself; a remilitarized 
Japan will obstruct China’s rise. Therefore, when assuming that a state is a rational 
decision-making organization, China’s military response to its threats must strengthen the 
military means to reduce them. In this regard, the Chinese A2/AD strategy, which China 
revised to prevent not only enemy forces’ entry into a theater of operation, but also to 
limit their freedom of action in a narrow area under direct Chinese control, was a relevant 
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means to protect its national interests.66 Consequently, Beijing’s efforts to develop the 
A2/AD capabilities—anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCMs), and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and submarines—can be convincing 
indicators of the Chinese response against the NDG.  
In terms of another research question of this research about why the NDG 
intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, this thesis uses two branches of 
theoretical view: realism and constructivism. As Walt has argued, “no single approach 
can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics.”67 He points out that 
applying various theories, rather than a single theoretical approach, can strengthen 
explanatory power in regard to determining complicated and multi-layered contemporary 
phenomena. Thus, a different theoretical approach of realism and constructivism can 
provide a more persuasive explanation of why the NDG aggravated Beijing’s threat 
perception.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters. Chapter I introduces the thesis research 
question, importance, hypothesis, literature review, and main frameworks to propose its 
structure and purpose. Chapter II analyzes how the security circumstance of East Asia 
and the U.S. and Japanese perceptions in the post-Cold War produced the NDG, which is 
an essential variable. Chapter III determines what China’s response to the NDG was by 
analyzing China’s perception, and its diplomatic and military efforts. To analyze an 
essential cause why the NDG catalyzed the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, Chapter IV 
uses two theoretical perspectives: realism and constructivism. Finally, Chapter V not only 
determines why the NDG was a catalytic factor in the Sino-Japanese security dilemma by 
summarizing the results of this research, but it also presents why two combined 
theoretical perspectives can complementarily suggest a more convincing explanation 
regarding contemporary international politics.  
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II. THE U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL ALLIANCE AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 
In the Cold War, the alliance with Japan efficiently enabled the United States to 
contain the Soviet Union’s expansion in East Asia. For the Japanese side, the U.S.-Japan 
alliance not only provided Japan an umbrella against the nuclear threat of the Soviet 
Union, but it also gave benefits to various fields, such as importing advanced U.S. 
techniques and securing the U.S. consumer market. With these two countries’ common 
perspective on national security, the United States and Japan maintained their strong 
security alliance despite the unequal roles and responsibilities imposed on the two 
countries. 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the historical watershed that came from 
the disappearance of the United States and Japan’s major enemy, the Soviet Union, made 
them reevaluate their bilateral alliance. In the early 1990s, the disappearance of a 
common enemy deepened U.S.-Japanese conflicts, which had been regarded as less 
important compared to national security issues during the Cold War. For example, the 
two nations fought over trade and the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan. 
Furthermore, the United States and Japan clashed during the Gulf War and the 1994 
North Korean Nuclear Crisis, which further accelerated the necessity for these two 
countries to redefine their bilateral security relationship. This new security environment 
led them to contemplate a distinctive role of the U.S.-Japanese alliance; as a result, the 
1996 Joint Declaration and the NDG were created.  
In terms of the realignment of the U.S.-Japan relationship, this chapter attempts to 
determine which strategic decisions of both countries during the 1990‒1997 period 
influenced the continuance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, despite some conflicts during a 
transition period after the Cold War. Therefore, this chapter comprehensively analyzes 
the reinforcement and exacerbation variables that could influence the cohesiveness of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, and produce the NDG. Moreover, the outcome revealed why the 
United States and Japan agreed to reaffirm the bilateral alliance, despite the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. 
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A. THE U.S. AND JAPANESE SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE EARLY 
POST-COLD WAR ERA 
As Stuart Harris has argued, “even if less clearly defined, the implications of the 
end of the Cold War in Northeast Asia are no less portentous than those in Europe.”68 
Moreover, RAND, the U.S. National Defense Research Institute, mentions that the future 
of the Pacific Rim after the advent of the post-Cold War would show “a political and 
security environment” remarkably different from what the United Stated had confronted 
in the Cold War era.69 Therefore, even though the common enemy of the United States 
and Japan—the Soviet Union—had disappeared, these two countries still regarded the 
security environment of East Asia as persistently fluid, uncertain, and changed. In this 
regard, this chapter determines how the United States and Japan assessed the security 
circumstance of the early post-Cold War period by analyzing both countries’ official 
strategic reports in the beginning of the 1990s. 
1. The U.S. East Asia Strategy in the Early Post-Cold War Era 
On August 2, 1990, U.S. President George Bush made a speech in Aspen, 
Colorado, which encouraged Asian allies to contribute to regional security. Furthermore, 
the Department of Defense (DOD) published the Strategic Framework for the Asian 
Pacific Rim that gave shape to the guidelines for the “U.S. strategic objectives, needed 
military capabilities, and selected policies.”70 Therefore, analyzing this report provides 
valuable implications for determining what the U.S. strategic recognition of the early 
1990s was.  
According to the Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, with the demise 
of the Soviet Union, the U.S. strategic intention showed that the United States promoted 
its friends and allied countries, which had sufficient economic, political, and military 
capabilities, to increase its contribution to peace in the Pacific Rim. In this regard, the 
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fundamental reasons why the United States urged its allies to play more roles in the 
regional security resulted not from a decreasing security threat, but from the recognition 
of declining U.S. economic power. This is because the United States evaluated the 
security status of Asia as uncertain given the persistence of communist regimes in East 
Asia—China, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam.71 As the U.S. trade deficit had been 
accumulating since the mid-1980s, the Bush administration had to settle its economic 
problems. With the decline of U.S. economic power, the U.S. government had to reduce 
its security contribution in East Asia, where economic growth was the fastest in the world. 
Hence, the United States strongly required its allies to strive for more “reciprocal and 
mature economic, political, and defense partnerships” due to the buildup of its allies’ 
national ability.72 
Both the U.S. economic decline and the necessity of sustaining security stability 
led to a new U.S. strategic decision that reduced its forward deployed forces and 
strengthened the Asian allies’ cost sharing. The detailed framework of the U.S. military 
posture embodied in the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative Report (EASI) that was the 
“three-phased approach to maintain an appropriate structure of forward deployed forces 
in East Asia.”73 As the plan of the EASI explained, the DOD was supposed to enforce 
the reduction in U.S. deployed forces in Asia in three phases. 
During Phase I (1990‒1992), the DOD reduced the U.S. force in “Japan, Korea, 
and Philippines by 15,250.”74  Detailed reductions included “more than 5,000 Army 
personnel, 5,400 Air Force personnel, almost 1,200 Navy personnel, almost 3,500 
Marines, and joint organization personnel.”75 In fact, the reduction of the U.S. forces was 
nearly 12 percent of the deployed troops in Asia; the planned reductions were completed 
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by the end of 1992. 76  Therefore, the United States strove to simplify its military 
constitution by supporting the reduced number of troops in Asia. 
The Phase II (1993‒1995) of the EASI included the withdrawal of an additional 
6,500 forces in South Korea and reductions of approximately 200 U.S. Air Force billets 
in Okinawa.77 However, uncertainty and a threat of North Korea’s nuclear program 
deferred the reductions of combat forces in South Korea. Hence, the new appearance of 
North Korea’s nuclear threat disrupted the progress of the U.S. military reductions. 
During Phase II (1993‒1995), the United States merely reduced small numbers of U.S. 
Air Force personnel in Okinawa. 
According to Phase III (beginning 1996), the United States contributed the 
security of the Asian region by solidifying its military bases of South Korea and Japan. 
Furthermore, the United States continued to reinforce various military exercises and 
maintain a permanent base structure with the Asian allies for preparing for an urgent 
situation. In accordance with strengthening the alliance with Japan, “the United States 
Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region,” which DOD issued in February 1995, 
emphasized the importance of the deployed troops in Asia and its alliance with Japan.78 
In terms of “the 1995 U.S. strategy toward the East Asia Pacific Region,” the 
1995 new U.S. strategy report strongly called for increasing its military troops by 
100,000 and strengthening security cooperation with Japan. However, this report 
ironically demonstrated how much the United States changed its East Asia strategy in 
contrast with the 1990 reduction plan of the EASI. To determine why the U.S. strategy 
had drastically changed in the short period, this chapter explicitly analyzes which 
strategic variables—especially the 1990‒1997 period—had influenced the change of the 
U.S. East Asia strategy. Furthermore, this chapter also determines how the U.S. strategic 
recognition of Japan had evolved in parallel with the change of the U.S. East Asia 
strategy.   
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2. The Japanese Strategy of the Early Post-Cold War Era 
According to Japan’s 1992 defense white paper, Japan regarded the security of 
East Asia as uncertain because of “the continuing confrontation between North and South 
Korea, the multinational dispute over the islands, and the unresolved conflict in 
Cambodia.” 79  Furthermore, the Japanese security experts strongly warned about the 
threat of Russian military forces despite the Soviet Union’s demise. The 1992 Japanese 
white paper argued that, it is not yet clear how the former Soviet Union’s massive 
military forces in the Far East will develop. As of now, the Far East has not seen 
significant movement toward arms reductions. Therefore, with the end of the Cold War 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been the main threat to Japan’s 
security, the rise of China, in Japan’s view, became a new threat.  
Japan also regarded the rise of China as another factor threatening the stability of 
its security. The evidence that China drastically increased its military expenditure since 
1990 accelerated Japan’s doubts about Chinese economic and military expansion. 
However, the Japanese of the early 1990s desired China to be neither “weaker nor 
militarily stronger.”80 This is because Japan perceived that a weaker China is highly 
likely to arouse social, economic, and political instability; it also could lead to the 
exponential growth of Chinese immigrants and refugees and a demand for greater 
economic aid. A stronger China, on the other hand, could become a rival in the East 
Asian region. To sum up, Japan did not consider China to be the most serious security 
threat in the early 1990s and anticipated that the conflict related to the Sino-Taiwan 
reunification would not trigger severe armed conflict.   
The 1992 defense white paper described the Korean peninsula: “the pattern of 
military confrontation between North and South has remained basically unchanged since 
the end of the Korean War, and the Korean Peninsula has remained an unstable factor for 
the security of East Asia including Japan….”81 Japan was especially concerned about the 
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possibility that “North Korea could develop nuclear weapons” because its scud missiles 
had a capability to deliver nuclear warheads to western Japan.82 Even though Japan had 
some worrisome points in 1992—the possibility of North Korea’s nuclear development 
and Kim Jung Il’s succession to power—Japan concentrated more on an economic, 
political, and security ripple effect that would come from the Koreas’ unification under 
South Korean terms. As the Soviet Union had provided economic and military support to 
North Korea, following its 1991 collapse the economic gap deepened between North and 
South Korea and likely influenced Japan’s evaluation of the Korean peninsula. 
In the late twentieth century, the Japanese perspectives over security policy were 
complicated and various. Tokyo’s assessments of the post-Cold War security 
environment promoted a discourse on Japan’s security policy; revising Tokyo’s security 
cooperation with Washington emerged as a key issue. As Richard J. Samuels argues, in 
the late-20th century, there were strong disputes within the elite and governmental level 
how “Japan should provide for its security.”83 Samuels categorizes the security policy 
preferences along with two axes—the alliance with the United States and the willingness 
to use force in international affairs (see Figure 2). One axis separated those who believed 
that the U.S. military power was paramount for Japan’s security, and those who asserted 
that Japan should keep away from the United States because Japan would be likely 
entangled in American intervention policy. These two different perspectives were divided 
by the second axis concerning acceptability of the use of force. The continued debates, 
such as whether Japan should revise its constitution to contribute international peace, also 
showed the divergence of Japanese security views. In short, the change of Japan’s 
security circumstance—the end of the Cold War and the conflicts with the United 
States—intensified the discourse on the issues of national security, and forced the 
Japanese government to shape a new security strategy. 
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Figure 2.   A discourse on Japan’s security policy.84  
In the early 1990s, the Japanese government determined that continuing the U.S.-
Japan security cooperation was far more beneficial to both regional and Japanese national 
security stability. In terms of Samuels’ classification of Japan’s security policy, Japan 
inclined to strive to be a normal nation. Among two essential elements, Tokyo pledged to 
maintain the close security relationship with the United States and heightened the SDF’s 
international role by joining the NDG. In this context, not only economic and social 
problems, but also the concerns of Japan over the abandonment and entrapment complex 
affected joining the NDG. To determine why Tokyo decided to maintain a close security 
alliance with the United States by joining the NDG, the following section analyzes the 
causal relationships between Japan’s domestic and international circumstance of the 
1990s, and the refinement of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. 
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B. THE U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THE 
EARLY 1990S 
In the Cold War era, even though the U.S.-Japan security alliance had confronted 
various conflicts, these two countries had never lost a firm cooperative relationship. A 
security threat that came from their common enemy, the Soviet Union, contributed to this 
strong security cooperation. However, the disappearance of the common enemy 
inevitably made the Japanese emphasize economic and social differences in the 
beginning of the post-Cold War era. Two of the most important U.S.-Japanese conflicts 
in the early 1990s were U.S.-Japanese trade friction and strengthened Japanese hostility 
to U.S. military bases.  
1. U.S.-Japanese Trade Friction 
The diminished Cold War threat of the late 1980s highlighted the emergence of an 
accumulated trade dispute. Moreover, both the huge Japanese trade surplus with the 
United States and the strong U.S. dollar caused U.S. national demand for an amendment 
to Japanese trade practices. Given the 1991 data on trade-balance and cumulative 
investment between the United States and Japan (see Table 1), one can determine how 
serious the trade imbalance between these two countries was. Continuing a substantial 
trade imbalance between the United States and Japan since the 1980s had promoted “a 
rise of nationalism and hostility in both countries.”85 Furthermore, both the United States 
and Japan had trouble in neutralizing critical public opinion toward each other because of 
the disappearance of the two countries’ common national interest.    
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Table 1.   Trade ratio of the U.S. and Japan in 1991.86 





United States 19 11 7 
Japan 22 29 40 
 
To solve the trade conflict, the Clinton administration exerted diplomatic pressure 
to open the Japanese market. However, the U.S. attempt to remove Japanese market 
barriers brought about noise and tension. Some Japanese scholars questioned U.S. 
trustworthiness and argued that Japan regarded alternative methods for its national 
security. Nevertheless, in 1993, the Hosokawa government endorsed a 102-item program, 
which strove to formulate and implement the specific economic deregulation policies.87 
As a result, although the program still saw the policies as significant, it also advocated 
that Japan must pursue an independent defense, and take multilateral, security 
cooperation into account as the alternative method for its bilateral alliance. 
2. Japanese Hostility to the U.S. Military Bases 
According to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, “for the purpose of 
contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air 
and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”88 These U.S. military bases resulted in 
the bilateral alliance, and have enabled both Washington and Tokyo to benefit from 
various strategic advantages. Furthermore, U.S. military bases in Japan exemplify mutual 
support for security interests between the United States and Japan. The United States 
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provides Japan with varied military support: “the nuclear umbrella, offensive power 
projection, and global intelligence.”89 In response, Japan offers “host nation support and 
bases for American forces.”90 Hence, the U.S. military bases on Japanese soil have 
represented a strong security relationship between the United States and Japan since the 
end of World War II. 
Nevertheless, some Japanese hostility to the U.S. military bases in Japan has 
persisted and varied in different localities, periods, and circumstances. The continued 
debate over the U.S. forces on Okinawa shows Japanese antagonism. In fact, nearly 75 
percent of all U.S. installations and 29,000 troops are stationed in Okinawa; it means that 
Okinawan citizens have sacrificed for the U.S.-Japan security alliance.91 However, most 
citizens agreed U.S. military capabilities are necessary to protect their national security; 
therefore, Japanese dissatisfaction over the U.S. bases was limited.   
The potential for Japanese discontent regarding the U.S. military bases strongly 
surfaced with the 1995 Okinawa rape in which three U.S. servicemen sexually assaulted a 
12-year-old Japanese girl. This incident catalyzed a deluge of Japanese animosity toward 
the U.S. military and led to a national consensus that Japan must revise the terms of the 
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-Japan Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA). Furthermore, some nationalist scholars asserted that Japan 
must strive to have autonomous military capabilities instead of depending on U.S. 
military power. As former Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa insisted, “only an end of 
Japan’s ‘protectorate status’ can create the necessary domestic political conditions for 
Japan to assume a balanced security role in regional and global affairs.”92  
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As a result, the United States conceded and agreed that Japan judge suspects by 
its law due to the fierce public opinion that the Japanese court must hold a trial and 
declare the offenders guilty.93 Furthermore, to solve the Okinawan citizens’ discontent, 
Washington and Tokyo established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) 
in November 1995 and announced that the United States would return approximately 21 
percent of the Okinawa military bases.94 Nevertheless, the dispute over the U.S. military 
bases has continued and frequently stood out; therefore, this means that a lingering 
discord over U.S. bases is likely to cause serious diplomatic conflicts between 
Washington and Tokyo. In this regard, both the United States and Japan jointly make an 
effort to decrease local hostility, which is a critical challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
C. THE CONCERNS OF JAPAN OVER THE ABANDONMENT AND 
ENTRAPMENT COMPLEX 
As Victor D. Cha points out, “abandonment and entrapment reflect the 
combination of opportunity and obligation inherent in any alliance arrangement.”95 The 
fear that the ally may leave an alliance triggers the fear of abandonment. When the ally 
fails to provide proper support in contingencies, where support is expected, the possibility 
of abandonment increases. Entrapment, on the other hand, happens when the ally’s 
performance of its responsibility becomes harmful to its national interest. Cha 
characterizes the abandonment and entrapment complex as “the balance of anxieties 
between allies.”96 For example, a state’s fear over abandonment is likely to be higher 
with high external threats perception, no alternative alliance partner, and no internal 
power. Entrapment fear, by contrast, is likely to be higher with unfavorable public 
opinion to war and the absence of external threat.     
The continued conflict from the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the Gulf War and the 
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis made Japan seriously concerned over the abandonment 
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and entrapment complex because of the alliance with the United States. As a result, both 
Washington and Tokyo’s cost-benefit calculation led them to refine their bilateral 
alliance. Given that both countries confronted a common security threat—North Korea 
and China—the highlight on new external threats of the post-Cold War era led Japan to 
mitigate the concern over the abandonment and entrapment complex and finally sign the 
NDG. 
1. The Gulf War in 1990‒1991 
The U.S.-Japanese diplomatic conflicts in the Gulf War sparked Japanese concern 
over abandonment and entrapment that the alliance with the United States might cause. 
As Michael H. Armacost, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan during 1989‒1993, argued, “the 
Gulf War was [the] defining moment in the evolution of U.S.-Japan relations.”97  
Japanese political and military role in the anti-Iraq coalition was insignificant in 
spite of its strong economic power. Japan exposed its constitutional and political 
limitations when the United States requested Japanese military support. Answering U.S. 
pressure on “Japan to contribute personnel as well as financial support to the coalition 
effort in the Gulf,” Tokyo solely provided 1.3 billion dollars to the coalition, but 
excluded personnel and materiel supply.98  In accordance with U.S. demands, Japan 
dispatched mine sweepers when the war was already over. For these reasons, some 
Americans questioned Japan’s reliability in the security alliance, which also increased 
distrust over Tokyo’s willingness to play an international role commensurate with its 
economic status, and encouraged the United States to reevaluate the efficacy of the U.S.-
Japan diplomatic relationship.  
Japan’s policy makers, in turn, seriously began reappraising the suitability of its 
low-posture security role, mandated by restrictions on the “use of force in Article 9 of the 
Peace Constitution and the depth of anti-militaristic norms among Japan’s citizenry,” in 
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the post-Cold War era.99 Japanese policy makers deeply recognized two complicated 
fears. One was that United States might leave the alliance because of Tokyo’s insufficient 
support in the Gulf War. The other was that Japan would be highly likely to drift into a 
war when Tokyo sends its military troops in contingencies. This also means that Japan 
must endure the ravages of war. Furthermore, the constitutional constraint on the 
international role of Self-Defense Forces no longer rationalizes Tokyo’s insufficient 
commitment to the alliance.  
In the end, as Armacost points out, the U.S.-Japan diplomatic experience in the 
Gulf War left wounds on both sides.100 The Japanese hesitation to share the hazards, as 
well as the expenses, of a major multilateral coalition made Washington question its 
security partner. Many Japanese, on the other hand, regarded U.S. criticism as excessive 
and a devaluation of Tokyo’s considerable financial support. Washington’s and Tokyo’s 
different perspectives on Japan’s international role were central to alliance tensions 
during the early-1990s. This tension was reconciled only after Tokyo changed its policies 
after the September 11 attacks of 2001—demonstrated by the SDF’s active support in the 
war in Afghanistan and in the reconstruction in Iraq,  
2. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1994 
In the post-Cold War period, North Korea gradually became an international 
security troublemaker; therefore, the Japanese policy makers analyzed how North 
Korea’s security threat could influence Japan’s security stability. Given North Korea’s 
limited military capabilities and economic collapse in the early 1990s, Japan was less 
likely to regard the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) bitter denunciation 
of the international sanctions as a critical security threat. However, the 1993 missile test, 
in which North Korea launched a Nodong-1 into the East Sea of Korea, caused security 
disputes that the North’s 1,000‒1,300 kilometer range ballistic missiles could attack a 
significant part of Japanese territory. Even though the accuracy of the North Korean 
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missiles was relatively low, Japanese security experts warned that the North’s “high-
explosive, biological, or chemical warheads” could have major effects in Japan’s urban 
population areas.101 As a result, North Korea’s missile threat strongly influenced the 
Japanese recognition that Pyongyang would be highly likely to use its missile capabilities 
as blackmail at a negotiation table.     
North Korea’s nuclear threat again highlighted the abandonment and entrapment 
complex in the U.S.-Japanese alliance. The different security objectives of these two 
countries led them to confront various levels of conflicts. For example, the United States 
as a superpower was focusing on maintaining the stability of the Korean Peninsula and 
preventing nuclear proliferation; on the other hand, Japan was primarily considering its 
own national security as its highest priority. Therefore, the two countries’ discord over 
their national interests led Japan to worry over the abandonment and entrapment 
complex; it also catalyzed the divergence of security priorities for the United States and 
Japan in dealing with the North Korea’s nuclear threat.  
Facing the North Korean nuclear threat provided Japan with a controversial 
question as to whether Japan should support the United States at the enormous risk of 
national security. As Christopher W. Hughes has argued, “the divergence of security 
priorities [between the U.S. and Japan] was revealed after Washington’s mid-1994 
request to activate the security treaty and procure Japanese logistical support.” 102 
According to the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Japan could 
support the U.S. forces “in the case of situations in the Far East outside Japan which will 
have an important influence on the security of Japan.”103  However, the ambiguous 
meaning of the articles brought about an interpretation dispute and sparked the debate 
whether Japan should be involved in supporting the U.S. sanctions against North Korea’s 
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nuclear weapons. Therefore, Japan was unable to actively support Washington’s requests 
because of the disagreement of opinion.  
For the American security experts, Tokyo’s uncooperative response to the U.S. 
request made them regard Japan as less trustworthy. Moreover, the repeated Japanese 
passive responses, which had continued since the Gulf War, intensified both countries’ 
recognition that Washington and Tokyo must realize the insufficiency of the guidelines 
and seek advanced security cooperation. As a result, North Korea’s nuclear threat not 
only exposed the strategic limitation and weakness of the bilateral alliance, but also 
promoted the subsequent alliance restructuring.     
D. THE NEW U.S.-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
Not only the new security environment of the early 1990s—which came from the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union—but also the continued decline of U.S. economic power 
made the United States reappraise its East Asia policy. The outcome of the new strategic 
assessment enabled the United States to reduce its number of military troops in Asia and 
impose more burdens on its Asian allies. Furthermore, the Bush administration 
simultaneously streamlined its U.S. military troops in Asia revolving around the alliance 
with Japan. Therefore, one can determine that the United States kept the strategic 
importance of the bilateral alliance with Japan, even if its common enemy, the Soviet 
Union, had disappeared. Moreover, the unstable East Asian security circumstances—
especially the rise of China and North Korean nuclear power—in the post-Cold War era 
led them to agree with the NDG. As a result, the U.S.-Japan security alliance persisted in 
maintaining its strategic importance despite the fluctuation of the U.S. security strategy of 
the post-Cold War era toward East Asia.  
1. The 1995 East Asia Strategic Report 
U.S. and Japanese officials discussed their advanced security cooperation before 
the 1995 East Asia Strategic Report (EASR) was released. Moreover, the continued 
exchange of opinions between the bilateral bureaucratic channels strongly influenced the 
1995 U.S. strategic report. The EASR had significant implications on Washington and 
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Tokyo’s redefinition of the role of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to pursue a common 
national strategy in the post-Cold War period. 
According to the EASR, the United States reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance as the “linchpin” of its security policy in Asia. 104  Moreover, this report 
emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in security, economic, and 
political fields. It also presented a suitable Asia strategy that the United States must 
actively continue forward military deployments and increase the number of U.S. military 
troops up to 100,000 in Asia. Therefore, the 1995 U.S. East Asia strategy placed a high 
value on the alliance with Japan to deter regional dispute and maintain its status quo.  
2. The 1996 Joint Declaration and the New 1997 Defense Guidelines 
After the U.S. DOD issued the EASR, both countries had a summit to redefine 
and assure its bilateral security alliance in 1996. The two governments reached three 
main agreements: enlarging Japan’s security role in Asia, confirming the significance of 
U.S. forward deployment in East Asia and Japan, and emphasizing more reciprocal and 
balanced bilateral alliance.105 Moreover, a summit held by the two countries firmly 
pledged that the United States and Japan would revitalize the bilateral cooperation at a 
regional and global level. The discord in the U.S.-Japan alliance created by the Gulf War 
and North Korean nuclear crisis encouraged both countries to reappraise the feasibility of 
the bilateral alliance and finally pledge to revise the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines 
signed in 1978.  
According to the NDG, the United States and Japan pledged to increase 
information sharing and coordinate peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.106 
Moreover, Japan can support U.S. forces by providing various facilities and military 
support at a rear area. Therefore, the U.S. military can use the Japanese civilian airports 
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and harbors and receive the various military support including fuel and oil. Many 
scholars evaluate that the NDG has important strategic implications because it spells out 
the U.S-Japan cooperation “during situations in areas surrounding Japan.”107 In other 
words, the new guidelines could provide Japan with the institutional basis to extend its 
military activity beyond the Japanese territory.  
In summary, the NDG presents the U.S. foreign policy toward Japan. First, the 
United States encouraged Japan—which had great economic power—to take more of a 
security role in Northeast Asia. Both the United States and Japan needed to adjust the role 
of the bilateral alliance confronting the new security circumstances. As determined before, 
the United States was confronted with critical discord about the U.S.-Japan alliance after 
the Soviet Union collapsed. In this regard, the Japanese passive posture in the Gulf War 
and the North Korean nuclear crisis made the United States recognize the necessity of a 
revised alliance. Second, the United States and Japan enhanced their joint operation 
capabilities by regularly conducting the U.S.-Japan joint military exercise. Moreover, the 
regular and extensive joint military exercises enabled both countries to demonstrate the 
solidity of their bilateral military cooperation.  
E. THE OUTCOME OF THE REFINED U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL 
ALLIANCE: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES 
This chapter has discussed how the United States and Japan agreed to the NDG 
after they had confronted challenges in the Gulf War and the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
This development is clear from not only comparing the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative 
Report and the 1995 East Asia Strategic Report, but also analyzing how these U.S. 
strategic plans proceeded in practice. Considering core contents of the 1990 East Asia 
Strategy, the U.S. planned to reduce its number of military troops in Asia and strengthen 
the burden sharing with Asia allies. As indicated previously, the decline of U.S. 
economic power and the changing security threat shaped its strategic decision. Even 
though the persistence of communist regimes—China, North Korea, Laos, and 
Vietnam—made the United States evaluate the security status of Asia as uncertain, the 
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Bush administration had to decrease its number of military troops in Asia because of its 
economic power weakening.  
Nevertheless, Washington regarded Tokyo as an invaluable security partner 
because of the rise of new threats. Given the reduction plan of the EASI, the United 
States decided to draw down the smallest number of American troops in Japan despite its 
having the largest number of military troops in Japan—Philippines: 14,800, South Korea: 
13,487, Japan: 5,473.108 Moreover, the United States encouraged Japan to take on greater 
burden sharing in accordance with Japanese economic power. Consequently, even though 
the Bush administration proceeded with its military reduction plan in Asia, the highlight 
of the 1990 U.S. Asia Strategy was to maintain its political and military leverage by 
reconstructing its forward-deployed forces with Japan as the center. 
For Tokyo’s side, maintaining the alliance with the United Sates was a more 
pragmatic strategy under the uncertainty of East Asia’s security. Furthermore, the rise of 
China and a threat of North Korean nuclear weapons provided fertile ground to simulate 
the Japanese threat perception. Given that Japan, in fact, did not have tactical capabilities 
to conduct independent operations and could not present another security partner as an 
alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as Cha mentioned previously, Tokyo was likely to 
fear abandonment more than entrapment.  
The United States realized the strategic limitations of the bilateral alliance by 
experiencing continued critical international issues—the Gulf War and the 1994 North 
Korea Nuclear Crisis. Furthermore, the U.S. security decision makers acknowledged that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was unable to resolve the security uncertainty of East 
Asia due to the emergence of new security threats such as China and North Korea. 
Therefore, the United States needed to solve these two emerging security problems—
Japan’s limited security role and the continued unstable security environment of East 
Asia. The Clinton administration alleviated its security threats and maintained a strong 
military commitment in East Asia by redefining the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. The U.S. 
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government also continued to encourage Japan to change its security role in the regional 
and global security problems.  
Moreover, the overlap of the United States and Japan’s threat perception—a rise 
of China and North Korean nuclear weapons—explicitly reflected the reinforcement of 
the BMD cooperation that was the essential element of the NDG. Given that China 
continued to develop ballistic and cruise missile technologies in 1990s, it would provide 
sufficient grounds for the U.S.-Japanese BMD cooperation. In this context, Japan 
publicly argued that the purpose of the BMD system was only for deterring the North 
Korean nuclear threat not for China. Nevertheless, taking the East Asian security 
environment of 1990s as a whole, one can deduce that the United States’ and Japan’s 
shared worries about China and North Korea’s nuclear weapons led them to cooperate on 
the development of BMD by joining the NDG.   
Consequently, the NDG was the result of both countries’ strategic calculations. 
For the U.S. side, Washington continued to need Japanese support to maintain the East 
Asian security stability against the rise of China and the North Korean nuclear threat. For 
this reason, the United States constantly adhered to the U.S.-Japan alliance as a strategic 
security stronghold of East Asia even though its decision makers enforced the reduction 
plan to alleviate its economic pressures. Japan also realized that its alliance with the 
United States was an optimal choice for its national interests. The combination of Japan’s 
internal and external circumstances in the 1990s—its insufficient internal capabilities and 
a rise of new external threats—made Tokyo more fearful over abandonment than 
entrapment, which the alliance with the United States might trigger.   
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III. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE 
GUIDELINES  
This chapter evaluates the Chinese reactions to the NDG in two aspects: 
diplomatic and military behavior. After the United States and Japan agreed to the NDG, 
Beijing criticized the potential threat that the U.S.-Japanese diplomatic pledge may 
represent to China itself and to East Asia’s security stability. In this regard, Beijing’s 
diplomatic reactions include open criticisms, reinforcement of a united opposition, and 
condemnation of the Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni visits. In addition, the PLA’s buildup of 
A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the NDG represents Chinese military behavior 
particularly reactive to the NDG. As a result, this analysis assesses whether China 
regarded the NDG as a security threat and presents China’s security concerns. Moreover, 
breaking down the Chinese reactions to the NDG into diplomatic and military behavior, 
clearly organizes evidence of the causal relationships between the NDG and the Sino-
Japanese security dilemma. 
A. THE CATALYTIC FACTOR OF THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE 
GUIDELINES 
As determined in Chapter II, the NDG emphasized the expanded U.S.-Japan 
security cooperation in repelling an external attack against Japan and for crisis situations 
in “areas surrounding Japan.”109 As this document explains, “the concept, situations in 
areas surrounding Japan, is not geographical but situational.”110 Moreover, they pledged 
to closely cooperate and coordinate against a ballistic missile threat.111 However, these 
two strategic agreements conversely provoked the Chinese fear of unwanted 
consequences—the U.S.-Japanese intervention in the Sino-Taiwan unification, the U.S 
containment of the rise of China, and a remilitarization of Japan. In this regard, this 
                                                 





chapter, at first, analyzes why these implications of the NDG threaten China’s security 
stability.  
1. The Ambiguous Article of the New 1997 Defense Guidelines 
The NDG stipulated the role of the SDF as logistics and rear-area supports in time 
of regional conflict. Those roles involve “intelligence gathering, surveillance, and 
minesweeping missions.”112 Furthermore, Washington and Tokyo announced, “the scope 
of the alliance covers situations in the area surrounding Japan.”113 In regard to this 
ambiguous meaning, Beijing questioned its strategic implication and interpreted the 
scope of the U.S-Japan alliance as extending to Taiwan and the South China Sea. As 
Thomas J. Christensen states, “situational rather than geographic imperatives” determine 
the definition of the guidelines’ scope. 114  Therefore, the ambiguous article of the 
Guidelines intensified Beijing’s suspicion of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
In respect to the ambiguous article of the NDG, Paul Midford argues that the 
language of the Guidelines was more likely to grant a legitimate authority to Japan in 
dealing with regional conflicts.115 Given the role of the SDF, which has been shown 
during the regional crises of the 1990s, Japan’s security role had been restricted as only a 
non-combat operation. Even though the new Guidelines reassured that the SDF can solely 
offer logistical support, which is distinguished from areas of combat operations by 
specifying the forty examples of such support, the agreement enabled the U.S. and Japan 
to legitimately enforce joint-operational planning and exercise. For these reasons, Beijing 
realized that the enhancement of the U.S.-Japanese joint military capability will most 
likely be applied to the Sino-Taiwan crisis by considering the situational scope of the 
NDG.  
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2. The U.S.-Japanese Cooperation of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
For Beijing’s side, another unacceptable factor was the U.S.-Japanese agreement 
to cooperate against a ballistic missile threat. This comprehensive pledge, which will 
allow the U.S.-Japan security forces to cooperatively deal with a ballistic missile threat, 
was sufficient to make China suspicious that “Japan will deploy a TMD system.”116 
Furthermore, the August 1999 agreement of the U.S. and Japan to materially cooperate in 
ballistic missile defense demonstrated that the Chinese fear was not an exaggeration. 
However, the Japanese officials point out that TMD is a solely defensive military means 
also intended as a deterrence measure against North Korean ballistic missiles. 
Nevertheless, as Garrett and Glaser argue, most Chinese officials and analysts maintain 
that, “the target of TMD in the region is certainly Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons, 
not North Korea.”117 Hence, the U.S.-Japan agreement to cooperate in a TMD, which 
was comprehensively reflected in the NDG, triggered Chinese doubt; furthermore, the 
1999 U.S.-Japan agreement made Beijing solidify its anti-TMD sentiment.  
B. BEIJING’S DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS 
Beijing’s diplomatic reactions to the NDG fall into two categories: a direct and an 
indirect realm. A direct realm includes Beijing’s criticism to the NDG’s aggressive 
intentions and diplomatic efforts to form a united opposition. An indirect realm, on the 
other hand, describes Beijing’s diplomatic attempt to make domestic and international 
public opinion view the NDG as the revival of Japanese militarism. In this regard, the 
remarkable increase in Beijing’s criticisms of Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine persuasively reveals this aspect of China’s diplomatic reactions. As a 
result, Beijing’s direct and indirect diplomatic endeavors indicate how the Chinese 
perceive the NDG as a threat.  
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1. Criticizing the Strategic Objectives of the New 1997 Defense 
Guidelines 
According to Paul Midford, China’s responses to the NDG were contradictory and 
complicated.118 He asserts that Chinese official statements about it have unquestionably 
converged on three aspects: U.S. power aggregation, the Taiwan Straits, and the 
remilitarization of Japan. As the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pointed out, the 
guideline proposes that “the treaty may be extended to cover the whole region.”119 Thus, 
the Chinese official statement showed their fears about the strengthening of U.S. military 
power in the East Asia region. The famous newspaper in China, Guangming Daily, 
maintained that strengthening the military coordination between the U.S. and Japan 
means that the two countries work “hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific 
region.”120 Hence, China regards the NDG as the beachhead of the U.S. that helps 
maintain its hegemony in East Asia.  
After the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kajiyama Seiroku, caused a dispute 
in August 1997 by saying that “the revised Guidelines should explicitly cover Taiwan 
and the Taiwan Straits,” the Chinese Premier Li Peng sharply criticized it through a 
public address.121 In regard to the Taiwan issue, Beijing has sensitively reacted to the 
separate independence movement of Taiwan. Japanese scholar Kori J. Urayama 
maintains that, “all the Chinese analysts interviewed cited the Taiwan factor as the 
foremost reason for Chinese opposition” to the NDG.122 Given that one of China’s 
national objectives is the reunification of Sino-Taiwan, the fact that Beijing regards the 
NDG as a critical threat means that continuous Chinese opposition and suspicion to the 
strategic purposes of the NDG will persist.   
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According to Ronald Montaperto in the National Defense University, China’s 
strong opposition to the NDG reaches beyond the Taiwan scenario, and thus embraces 
concerns over granting a bigger role to Japan in the region.123 The Chinese concerns 
about Japan’s military autonomy came to the surface when President Jiang Zemin visited 
the United States in November 1997.124 Even though President Clinton attempted to 
explain that the strategic purposes of the NDG are not related to China, Jing emphasized 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and its brutal occupation of China.125 Moreover, in 
Jing’s interview with the Washington Post, he warned that the United States disregarded 
the lessons of the past to enable Japan’s resurging militarism.126   
Likewise, the Chinese media has focused on the strategic function of the U.S.-
Japanese alliance, which used to contain Japanese remilitarization, but now justified it. 
An article of the People’s Daily explicitly charged that the NDG would be an important 
watershed for promoting Japanese militarism.127 The New China News Agency argued 
that the NDG, by redefining the bilateral alliance to encompass regional security, 
encourages Japan to break the provisions set out in “the Japanese constitution that Japan 
shall not exercise the right of collective self-defense.”128 Furthermore, some Chinese 
strategists and analysts are seriously concerned about the possibility that Japan could 
choose nuclear weapons as strategic means.129 Many Chinese regarded the NDG as the 
strategic umbrella that could lead Japan to develop nuclear weapons.   
2. Strengthening a Sino-Russian United Opposition 
In response to the U.S.-Japanese cooperation of the BMD systems, which was an 
essential agreement of the NDG, China began to build a strong, united opposition 
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relationship with Russia. Beijing’s perception of the U.S.-Japanese cooperation of the 
BMD as a threat corresponds to that of Russia. On April 16, 1999, China and Russia 
issued a communique that the two were strongly concerned about the issue and 
emphasized their cooperation to oppose the BMD.130 As conflicts arose between the U.S. 
and Russia in 1999, some Russian strategists asserted that the Russo-Chinese relationship 
would perform a role as an efficient military alliance against U.S. encroachment.131 
According to Paradorn Rangsimaporn, a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Kingdom of Thailand, “with increasing U.S. involvement in Central Asia, Russia’s 
traditional sphere of influence, and the American-led invasion of Iraq is 2003, Moscow’s 
old suspicions of Washington returned to the foreground and ties with China were again 
emphasized.”132 Hence, a strategic consensus between China and Russia led them to 
strongly oppose the NDG with one voice. 
The fact that the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, visited Beijing in July 2000, 
demonstrates the warming in Sino-Russian diplomatic relations. The fact that one of the 
key outputs of the summit was “the signing of a joint declaration condemning the U.S. 
plan to create a TMD system,” shows that both Russia and China regarded the U.S.-
Japanese cooperation as a threat that strongly undermines their own security. 133  In 
addition, their mutual agreement about both states’ territorial integrity means that Putin 
and Jiang agreed to deepen the Sino-Russian friendship.  
In July 2001, the new Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and 
Cooperation between China and Russia, showed the Chinese strategic intent against the 
U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Given that China had refused to consider the Soviet’s 
proposition for a new treaty after the Sino-Soviet Treaty expired in 1980, the fact that 
Jiang proposed a new treaty at a July 2000 summit meeting demonstrates that Beijing 
endeavored to deal with the new security threats from the NDG by enhancing a common 
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opposition. As Elizabeth Wishnick argued, the strategic partnership between China and 
Russia draws “its strength from a shared interest in countering American unilateralism in 
international relations.”134 
This renewable treaty between China and Russia shows that the Chinese perceive 
the NDG as a threat. Given that Chinese strategists had denied any kinds of alliances and 
regarded Russia as an unreliable state in the past, one can deduce that Beijing’s 
diplomatic efforts to cooperate with Russia is a noticeable change in policy.  
3. Criticizing the Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine 
Since the collapse of the Empire of Japan, Japanese Prime Ministers have visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine 65 times (see Table 2).135 However, Beijing’s responses to these 
visits have varied from ignoring to strongly complaining about them. In fact, the Chinese 
government had showed little diplomatic protest over the Yasukuni visits until the mid-
1990s. For this reason, Beijing’s concern over the Yasukuni Shrine visits increased after 
the signing of the NDG, which provides persuasive evidence that the NDG made China 
more concerned over Japan’s aggressive intentions.  
If Beijing increased its criticism of the Yasukuni Shrine visit after the NDG, one 
can deduce two fundamental reasons for this behavior. First, China feels that the NDG 
represents the revival of Japanese militarism. Second, the Chinese government seeks to 
shape domestic and international public opinion to negatively view a remilitarized Japan. 
In other words, Beijing wanted help form negative world public opinion of the NDG. 
Simultaneously, China increased its own nationalism, which makes territorial disputes 
with Japan more likely by emphasizing Japanese remilitarism. No matter which 
explanation better explains Beijing’s intentions, one can conclude that Beijing regarded 
the NDG as a potential threat based on how Beijing increased its criticism of the 
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Yasukuni Shrine visits. This is because Beijing regards Yasukuni visits as an exhibition 
of Japanese militarism and aggressiveness. 
Table 2.   Japanese prime minister visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.136 
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Among the 65 visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, Beijing responded 10 times (15.4 
percent) while ignoring the other 55 visits (84.6 percent).137 Analyzing the chronological 
pattern, one can divide the periods of Prime Minister visits into three different categories: 
Mao (1949–1976), Deng (1976–1989), and the post-1989 leadership era (1989–2013). In 
the Mao era, Beijing ignored all 30 of the Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits.138 During the 
Deng era, Beijing responded only twice (in 1982 and 1985) during 26 visits. After 1989, 
the next visit did not take place until 1996; Chinese leaders have responded to each of the 
8 visits since (see Table 3).139   
Table 3.   Beijing’s periodic responses to the Yasukuni Shrine visits. 






The Number of Visiting 
(65) 30 27 8 
The Number of Ignoring 
(55) 30 (100 percent) 25 (92.6 percent) 0 (0 percent) 
The Number of Response 
(10) 0 (0 percent) 2 (7.4 percent) 8 (100 percent) 
 
From this analysis, one can find three important pieces of evidence. First, Mao 
completely ignored the Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Second, Deng also 
ignored most of the visits and only responded twice. Specifically, after Beijing strongly 
condemned Nakasone’s 1983 visit, they continued to ignore Nakasone’s following seven 
visits. In regard to Nakasone’s planned 1985 visit, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) warned Tokyo that the visit would hurt the Chinese-Japanese relationship. The 
government wasn’t the only one to protest, however. In the Deng era, university students 
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led the 1985 anti-Japanese demonstrations that were likely to disturb the government-led 
economic initiatives. Yet Hu Yaobang, then-CCP general secretary, appealed for the 
demonstrators “to avoid disruption to economic initiatives.”140 For this reason, the Deng 
government suppressed the anti-Japanese sentiment and did not express strong diplomatic 
condemnation of the Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni visits. Finally, Beijing has strongly 
responded to all of the Yasukuni Shrine visits since 1989, all but one of which took place 
after the adoption of the NDG. 
Taken together, China’s responses to the Yasukuni Shrine visits seem to have 
varied as its political and economic purposes have evolved. In the Deng era, the Chinese 
government tended to ignore the Yasukuni Shine visits and even suppress the anti-
Japanese movement, given Japan’s economic strength and its role in China’s economic 
development. However, since Hashimoto’s 2006 visit, the Chinese government has taken 
the lead in criticizing Japan and strived to link the Yasukuni visit with the revival of 
Japanese militarism. According to this evidence, the mid-1990s Chinese government 
obviously increased its criticisms of Japanese Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni visits. Beijing 
strives to connect this issue with Japan’s aggressiveness and the revival of militarism. 
Therefore, this increase in Beijing’s criticism explicitly reflects China’s high level of 
threat perception over Japan’s aggressiveness and its desire to publicize the possibility of 
Japan’s remilitarization.   
Applying this evidence to the causal relationship between the NDG and the Sino-
Japanese security dilemma, one can draw the logical conclusion that the strategic 
implication of the NDG was sufficient to make Beijing perceive it as the outcome of 
Japanese aggressiveness. Given that the NDG assured the expansion of SDF’s operational 
role in East Asian contingencies, China was likely to view it as a rise in the Japanese 
remilitarism. Moreover, Prime Minister Koizumi’s frequent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
(6 times during 2001–2006) convinced Beijing of Japan’s aggressive intentions.       
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C. BEIJING’S MILITARY BEHAVIOR: AN ACCELERATION IN THE 
BUILDUP OF ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) 
CAPABILITIES 
As the literature review determined, one of Beijing’s concerns about the NDG is 
that the consolidated U.S.-Japanese cooperation could disturb Sino-Taiwan reunification 
and contain the rise of China. Moreover, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis strongly led them 
to find proper military means against U.S. military intervention. In this regard, China’s 
A2/AD capabilities would be efficient military means against the intervention of U.S.-
Japanese troops in Sino-Taiwan reunification. Furthermore, given that Sino-Taiwan 
reunification is an essential prerequisite for the rise of China, the A2/AD capabilities also 
can be a relevant means to ensure the rise of China. For those reasons, determining 
whether the PLA accelerated the development of the A2/AD capabilities after the signing 
of the NDG sheds light on the causal relationships between Beijing’s fears of the 
consequences of the NDG and its military reactions.  
1. The Strategic Objectives of the A2/AD Capabilities  
The PLA’s preparation for their military challenges has converged on the 
development of A2/AD capabilities. After the United States deployed its aircraft carriers 
in the Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996, China acutely felt the necessity of military 
means to deter American’s intervention in China and Taiwan’s reunification. Moreover, 
the 1996 Chinese limitation against U.S. military power accelerated its military 
development to focus on restricting or controlling their adversaries’ access to its offshore. 
Hence, after China experienced the considerable maritime power of the U.S., the Chinese 
strategists were more likely to focus on the A2/AD capabilities due to its effectiveness 
with lower cost.  
For China, A2/AD capabilities include the following: space weapons, submarines, 
and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). Therefore, Beijing’s military modernization 
efforts are as follows. 
In terms of the Chinese space weapons, many Chinese military scholars assert that 
the First Gulf War was “a watershed” for military technology. China regards the 
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“weaponization of space and space warfare” as inevitable to surpass the United States.141 
The 1991 Gulf War showed how the United States’ military power was superior 
compared to other countries because of its precision-guided missiles, space-based 
Command and Control Systems, and reconnaissance satellites. The Chinese military 
strategists also realized the significance of space military technology due to the United 
States’ unrivaled superiority of space infrastructures, such as the Global Positioning 
System (GPS), reconnaissance satellites, and space-based radar.  
China’s efforts to develop space weapons resulted in the test of an anti-satellite 
(ASAT) capability in 2007. “The Xichang Satellite Launch Center in China” launched “a 
ballistic missile” to destroy a non-functioning “Chinese weather satellite.”142 It was 
China’s first exercise to test its anti-satellite (ASAT) system. Since 2007, China has 
continually developed “kinetic and directed-energy,” such as “lasers, high-powered 
microwave, and particle beam weapons, technologies” for ASAT systems.143 China will 
continue to develop the ASAT systems to prevent its potential adversaries from using 
space-based assets during crisis or conflict. 
The perception that space assets are important made China push ahead with the 
development of space military technology such as the Chinese satellite navigation system 
and the reconnaissance satellite. As the 2011 analysis of the U.S. DOD states, the 
Chinese Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) system will provide regional services 
with approximately 10 satellites by 2012.144 China has a plan to complete “the PNT 
system named BeiDou-2 by 2020,” with “a 35 satellite constellation” to provide “global 
coverage.”145 In addition, China’s Huanjing program is planning eight satellites, which 
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have “capabilities of infrared, multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging.”146 
Therefore, if the PRC’s space development plan progresses on schedule, its space 
capabilities will independently enable the PLA to maneuver with their own 
reconnaissance and PNT system.   
Another important military development of the Chinese A2/AD capability is 
submarines. The 2009 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report stated that. “the PRC has 
emphasized the submarine force as one of the primary thrusts of its military 
modernization effort since the mid-1990s.” 147  The U.S. DOD analysis states that, 
“China’s 2nd-generation SHANG-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are 
already in service and as many as five 3rd-generation SSNs will be added by 2013.”148 
This means that China’s submarine force will carry out operations quietly and cover a 
broader range during interdiction and surveillance. “The eight Kilos purchased from 
Russia” are equipped with the “highly efficient Russian-made Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles 
(ASCMs).”149 Therefore, the PLA’s continued submarine development is on schedule to 
achieve its military objectives, such as denying enemies’ access and expanding the PLA’s 
scopes of operation. 
China has developed and tested an “anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM),” which is 
“a theater-range ballistic missile.”150 These missiles strongly threaten U.S. forces due to 
their capabilities, which mainly enable them to attack moving vessels on the ocean. The 
U.S. DOD argues that “the missile has a range exceeding 1,500km and that it is intended 
to provide the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers in the 
Western Pacific Ocean (see Figure 3).”151 In regard to the Chinese ASBM threat, U.S. 
military scholars have strong concerns that these missile systems, which can combine 
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with “broad area maritime surveillance” and a “targeting system,” enable the PLA Navy 
to attack not only U.S. Navy forces, but also its partners’ maritime ships. Some U.S. 
military experts regard these “highly accurate ballistic missiles,” which can hit moving 
vessels at sea, “as a game-changing weapon.”152 Due to the capability of China’s DF-
21D missile, which can change its course, both U.S. and Chinese military experts agree 
how menacing the development of ASBM is as part of China’s A2/AD capabilities. 
  
Figure 3.  Maximum range of A DF-21/CSS-5 ASBM.153 
Given the PLA’s development of A2/AD capabilities, one can determine that it 
mainly focuses on denying enemies an approach into their periphery. As the U.S. DOD 
analyzes, China’s current military development provides the PLA with capabilities that 
“can engage enemies’ surface ships up to 1,800km from China’s coastline.” 154 
Moreover, the U.S. DOD continues to evaluate the PLA’s missile capability as China’s 
current missile system enables the PLA to “attack the U.S. regional air bases, logistical 
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facilities, and other ground-based infrastructure.”155 Therefore, China regards the long-
range anti-ship cruise or ballistic missile as a crucial means to achieve the PLA’s 
operational objectives. This perception makes China endeavor to develop multiple launch 
platforms of ASBMs.  
2. The Strategic Effectiveness of the A2/AD Capabilities against the 
U.S.-Japanese Intervention  
Chinese strategists regard A2/AD capabilities as an effective military strategy 
against the U.S.-Japanese intervention in the Cross-Strait conflict or the U.S. efforts to 
contain the rise of China. In this context, the PRC regards A2/AD capabilities, which can 
deter or deny enemies’ access into China’s borders and coastlines, as a prompt and 
efficient strategic means to propel the national military concept of “forward defense.” 
The “forward defense” means that, “the PLA prefers to fight a military conflict as far 
away from China’s borders and coastlines as is possible.” 156  As the China’s 2008 
Defense White Paper states, the PRC focuses on “attacking enemies’ weak points with a 
stress on asymmetric warfare.”157 The Chinese and even U.S. military strategists agree 
that the PRC’s asymmetric approaches against its national threats are effective strategic 
tools.  
China’s asymmetric military strategy seeks to enable China to deter its opponent’s 
superior platforms relatively inexpensively. For example, the PLA poses a threat to its 
enemies’ access by deploying several ASMBs launchers, while China’s potential 
enemies, especially the United States, might be reluctant to accept the risk of losing a 
much more expensive aircraft carrier. Consequently, A2/AD capabilities can be an 
efficient military means for China to accomplish its military strategic concept of “forward 
defense.”   
Another important concept related to A2/AD capabilities is “army building.” 
Observing the Gulf war, Chinese strategists asserted that the PLA must prepare to fight 
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“a limited war under high-tech condition[s].” The Chinese perception regarding the 
importance of technology in modern warfare since the early 1990s has enabled the PRC 
to focus on the PLA’s weapon system modernization. According to Mark Burles and 
Abram N. Shulsky’s argument in Patterns In China’s Use of Force, changes in the 
security threat and technology’s role in military conflict influenced the PLA’s military 
strategy in the early 1990s “at the strategic level (the type of war to be fought)” and “at 
the operational level (how a war would be fought).”158 This perception produced China’s 
“Two Transformations,” which has been “the military strategic guideline” since 1995 for 
“army building.”159 The “Two Transformations” demands that the PLA transforms itself 
to “an army preparing to win under modern, high-tech condition warfare,” and “an army 
based on high-quality.”160  
In terms of this “army building” military concept, China’s development of the 
A2/AD capabilities is closely linked to their use of high-tech weapon systems. Due to the 
A2/AD’s essential required condition that it should attack far-off enemies to deny its 
access, the A2/AD capabilities must depend on a long-range precision weapon system. In 
addition, to detect its enemies’ ships and submarines and acquire its real-time targeting 
information, developing an independent surveillance, and targeting system is essential. 
Therefore, given the nature of the A2/AD capabilities, which must integrate various 
categories of a high technology weapon system, development of A2/AD capabilities can 
accomplish the military concept of “army building.”   
3. Accelerating the Buildup of A2/AD Capabilities after the New 1997 
Defense Guidelines  
This section evaluates whether the NDG materially accelerated the development 
of A2/AD capabilities. Moreover, if the NDG stimulated the Chinese perception of a 
threat, Beijing would inevitably endeavor to increase its military countermeasures against 
it. In this regard, as determined above, the A2/AD capabilities could be a proper military 
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strategy to prevent the United States and Japan from containing China’s rise and 
reunification. In fact, the PLA’s buildup of A2/AD capabilities started from the early 
1990s, before the United States and Japan revised their security alliance. Nevertheless, if 
China further promoted its A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the revised NDG, this 
would demonstrate a causal relationship between the NDG and the Chinese perception of 
a threat from the U.S. and Japan. For this reason, the following section examines whether 
the buildup of the PLA’s A2/AD capabilities after the signing of the new NDG, in 
practice, was further accelerated. It does so by analyzing specific A2/AD military 
technology: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) 
and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), and Submarines.     
a. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) 
According to “China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Navy 
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” the PRC continually has been 
developing and testing an anti-ship ballistic missile. 161  The U.S. military analysts 
especially evaluate the DF-21D (see Figure 4), which is “a theater-range ballistic missile 
equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV),” as a “game-changing” 
weapon.162 Moreover, the DF-21D would be a more critical weapon since it can change 
its flying route.  
Between the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and present day, comparing the PLA’s 
ASBM capability shows that the Chinese military buildup focused on denying external 
power access to Sino-Taiwan reunification. Moreover, when the U.S. deployed their two 
aircraft carrier battle-groups during the 1996 crisis, the PLA had insufficient military 
means to prevent the U.S. Navy from accessing the vicinity of Taiwan. This painful 
experience most likely influenced Chinese military development. Given the deployed 
period of DF-21D, approximately in the year 2010, many defense analysts argue that 
China had strived to develop military technology to prevent the arrival of U.S. carrier 
groups in regional conflicts since the 1996 Sino-Taiwan Crisis. 
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Figure 4.  China’s Dong Feng 21D (DF-21D).163 
b. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) and Land-Attack Cruise Missiles 
(LACMs) 
According to “China’s Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast under the Public Radar,” the 
PLA’s investment in A2/AD capabilities is converging on the development and 
deployment of large numbers of ASCMs and LACMs on a wide-range of ground, air, and 
naval platforms.164 The Chinese sources point out that Chinese LACMs have a range that 
could attack as far as away as “Guam, Darwin, and Diego Garcia.”165 Moreover, China 
has strived to not only develop its own highly capable ASCMs (the YJ series), but also 
import Russian supersonic ASCMs.  
China continued to deploy two types of subsonic LACMs—the air-launched Yj-
63 with a range of 200 km and the 1500km-range ground-launched DH-10—since the 
mid-1990s.166 Moreover, the PLA possesses the Russian Klub 3M-14E SS-NX-30 LACM, 
which can be launched from the 636M Kilo-class submarines.167 As Christopher P. 
Carlson, the author of the Defense Media Network, argues, China has pushed forward a 
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flurry of activity in their ASCM programs since 1998, which coincidentally overlaps with 
the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. For those reasons, the PLA’s 
strategic efforts, which increase its capabilities of ASCMs and LACMs, have a direct 
correlation with the possibility of U.S.-Japanese intervention in Sino-Taiwan 
reunification. This is because the ASCMs and LACMs could be effective weapons 
against the intervention of an external power. 
c. Submarines 
The PLA’s continued efforts to modernize the submarine forces accelerated in the 
mid-1990s. As the DOD stated, “The PLA Navy places a high priority on the 
modernization of its submarine force.”168 China also has regarded its submarine forces as 
an essential military weapon against its adversary’s intervention since the U.S. deployed 
Navy forces in the 1996 Sino-Taiwan Crisis. According to the commissioning data of the 
PLA submarine, actual commissions of Chinese submarines significantly increased after 
the mid-1990s (see Table 4). In addition, this table shows that China has placed into 
service 52 submarines at an average of approximately 2.9 submarines per year. As 
Admiral Samuel Locklear, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command asserted, “China 
is planning to acquire a total of 80 submarines.”169 This data also shows that the PLA’s 
submarine development has moved from the diesel-powered attack submarine (Type SS) 
to the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and the nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN). Most experts argue that the current Chinese improvement in the area 
of submarine buildup has received benefits from Russian submarine technology and 
knowledge. 
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Table 4.   PLA Navy submarine commissionings (1995‒2012).170 
 
 
To determine the PLA’s strategic intentions related to the NDG, one must 
concentrate on the fact that the Chinese submarines are armed with one of the ASCMs, 
the wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes. Moreover, as the U.S. DOD points out, “8 
of the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia are armed with the highly capable Russian-made 
SS-N-27 Sizzler ASCM.”171 For that reason, the PLA is likely to regard submarine 
forces as a delivery system for A2AD capabilities. The submarine forces, which are 
armed with ASCMs or ASBMs, could prevent an adversary’s access to China’s territories.  
By analyzing Figures 5 and 6, one can deduce that China has strived to develop 
undetectable submarine forces against the sonar ability of opposing forces. As 
Commodore Sauders writes in Jane’s Fighting Ships, “the downward slope of the arrow 
in each figure indicates the increasingly lower noise level of the submarine designs 
shown; in general, quieter submarines are more difficult for opposing forces to detect and 
counter.”172 According to the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s acoustic quietness, 
China demonstrates the importance of this ability by commissioning improved 
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submarines after 2000, the SHANG and JIN Class. Their submarines will catch up with 
the Russian acoustic quietness technology in 2015. Furthermore, the Chinese diesel-
powered submarines, which have been commissioned since 2000—the SONG, YUAN, 
and KILO class—have already reached a significant level in a noise-reducing technology. 
 
Figure 5.   Acoustic quietness of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines.173 
 
Figure 6.  Acoustic quietness of Chinese non-nuclear-powered submarines.174 
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Given the strategic impact of the NDG and the objectives of A2/AD capabilities, 
one can deduce that Beijing pursued the arms buildup to prevent the United States and 
Japan from intervening in the Sino-Taiwan unification. As this chapter pointed out, the 
PLA’s ASBMs, ASCMs, LACMs, and submarines can efficiently restrain adversaries’ 
forces from accessing China’s coastline. The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis made China 
fundamentally doubt its military capabilities in the face of U.S. power projection. On the 
other hand, the NDG of the following year further intensified Beijing’s threat perception 
given its strategic implications. As this chapter determined above, the NDG implied 
reinforcement of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in East Asian regional conflicts; this 
simultaneously meant that Japan would explicitly join the U.S. in any intervention in a 
Sino-Taiwan crisis. In this context, one concludes that the combination of these two 
consecutive international issues made China to accelerate the development of A2/AD 
capabilities.  
D. CONCLUSION: THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES INTENSIFIED 
THE SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA 
As this chapter has determined, the Chinese response to the NDG can be 
classified in two aspects: diplomatic responses and arms buildup. In other words, China 
regarded the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese bilateral alliance, which the NDG created, 
as a security threat and strove to alleviate its security vulnerability by enforcing 
diplomatic cooperation and an arms buildup. As Robert Jervis described, a security 
dilemma occurs or intensifies when state A’s action, which mostly is an effort to increase 
its national security, leads state B to feel it as a security threat. This is because state B has 
to supplement its relative security weakening, which resulted from A’s action. Therefore, 
given the anarchic international structure, state A and B are highly likely to sink into the 
action-reaction process that is referred to as a spiral model.    
Applying this action-reaction process to the Sino-Japanese relationship, one can 
convincingly demonstrate how the NDG intensified the two countries’ security dilemma. 
As Chapter II pointed out, the U.S. and Japanese awareness of the unstable security 
environment of East Asia in the early 1990s, as well as their perceived need to redefine 
its bilateral alliance, which originated from the Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean 
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nuclear crisis, led them to revise the NDG. Moreover, the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan 
bilateral alliance fundamentally achieved both countries’ common strategic objectives, 
which enabled them to strengthen their national security against potential and existent 
adversaries—China and North Korea. As a result, China, which had been emerging as a 
new economic and military power, strongly influenced the U.S. and Japanese strategic 
decision.  
On the other hand, the enforcement of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance made 
the PRC doubt the U.S.-Japanese strategic objectives and perceive it as a security threat. 
Moreover, the Chinese scholars and Foreign Ministry spokesman concentrated on 
reporting three negative effects of the NDG to protect its security: the aggregation of U.S. 
power in East Asia, U.S.-Japanese cooperation as an obstacle to Sino-Taiwan 
reunification, and the justification of remilitarized Japan. Given Beijing’s official 
responses, China explicitly realized that the reform of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance by 
revising the NDG could be a security threat. With the recognition of the NDG as a 
security threat, Beijing has showed various levels of diplomatic and military responses—
strengthening a Sino-Russian united opposition, highlighting the aggressive intentions of 
Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni Shrine visits, and accelerating the buildup of A2/AD 
capabilities.  
The action-reaction process, shown in the relationships between China and the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, obviously demonstrates the security dilemma’s spiral model. The 
United States and Japan’s security effort to increase their security power conversely led 
China to strongly doubt their strategic aggressiveness and to devise a countermeasure in 
various fields. Moreover, as this chapter determines, China not only increased its 
diplomatic efforts since the U.S. and Japan redefined the NDG, but also encouraged the 
PLA’s arms buildup, especially the development of the A2AD capabilities. The PRC has 
grappled to find a proper solution against its exposed security vulnerability. As a result, 
the NDG, which was the representative symbol of the U.S and Japanese security 
agreement, convincingly intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
Another objective of this thesis is to determine why China showed strong negative 
reactions to the transformation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. Even though many 
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security experts argue that the growing North Korean nuclear threat and the desire of the 
U.S. to increase the Japanese security role in the region caused the redefinition of the 
NDG, Beijing has concentrated on the possibility that the U.S.-Japan alliance can 
intervene in the Sino-Taiwan crisis and contain the rise of China. In this regard, the 
following chapters use two theoretical perspectives, realism, and constructivism, to 
determine which elements shaped these Chinese strategic perceptions. Yet, these two 
theoretical perspectives combined together can provide a better explanation in terms of a 
causal relationship of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
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IV. REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE SINO-JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA 
This chapter uses two theoretical perspectives—realism and constructivism—to 
determine why the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Furthermore, a 
combination of these two perspectives efficiently provides a more persuasive explanation 
for the post-1997 intensification of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma than either 
perspective by itself. This combination provides a new theoretical tool that can throw 
better light on the analysis of contemporary international politics.  
A. THE VIEW OF BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY ON THE CHINESE 
OPPOSITION TO THE NEW 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES 
Realism has been described as the most reliable theory during the Cold War era 
and even presents a sufficient explanation in current international politics. The core 
assumption of the realism theory on international politics is a power struggle between 
self-interested states. To determine why China strongly regarded the NDG as its national 
threat and strove to alleviate a potential threat, this chapter uses Stephen M. Walt’s 
balance of threat theory. Walt’s realist view can provide a better theoretical tool in regard 
to determining why the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, and 
efficiently supplement Kenneth N. Waltz’s insufficient balance of power theory. 
1. Balancing Against the U.S.-Japanese Threats 
According to Walt’s balance of threat theory, states strive to “form alliances to 
balance against threats,” which the combination of four elements—”aggregate power, 
proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions”—directly affect.175 Moreover, 
states choose allies to balance against the most serious threat, and prefer balancing to 
“bandwagoning,” except in the cases of weak and isolated states.176 In contrast with 
Waltz’s logic, Walt’s balance of threat theory regards aggregate power as an important 
but not the only component that forms a state’s threat perception.   
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In regard to analyzing Beijing’s fears of the NDG, as the literature review 
previously determined, Waltz’s balance of power theory is insufficient to explain China’s 
opposition to remilitarized Japan. However, considering Walt’s four variables—
aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions—
rather than power alone, provides a more reliable explanation for determining why the 
NDG threatened Beijing.   
First, the U.S. and Japan aggregated power by signing the new NDG, which is 
sufficient to threaten Beijing. The NDG has an important strategic implication because it 
spells out “the U.S-Japan cooperation during situations in areas surrounding Japan.”177 
Moreover, the NDG included various levels of security cooperation between the U.S.-and 
Japan. For example, the U.S. and Japan pledged to increase information sharing and 
coordinate peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.178 Furthermore, Japan can 
support the U.S. forces by providing various facilities and military support in a rear area. 
Supposing the possibility that China clashes with either the U.S. or Japan, or even both, 
Beijing is likely to regard the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance as a big 
challenge. In short, China as the non-U.S. ally sufficiently perceived the reinforcement of 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a direct threat to its security.  
Second, as Walt argues, “states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those 
that are far away.”179 In this respect, one state’s geographic closeness is likely to affect 
the other states’ assessment on how intense they calculate that state’s military power as a 
security threat. States also regard military capabilities of its neighboring states as more 
menacing than those of far-off states, which are constrained by distance. Furthermore, the 
ocean’s strong restraint on power projection leads states to solidify their belief that a 
close state’s voice could be vividly heard and felt.180 In this context, the U.S. military 
bases in Japan strongly influence the Chinese perception of threats. Due to the closeness 
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of the U.S. military bases, the U.S. can unrestrictedly intervene in various East Asian 
disputes. Therefore, even if the U.S. is separated by the Pacific Ocean and located far 
away from China, the military bases in Japan countervail its regional isolation.  
Third, a state that owns or newly obtains offensive capabilities is likely to be 
viewed by the other states as more aggressive. However, given that one of the Chinese 
fears over the NDG is the U.S.-Japanese TMD cooperation, some scholars raise questions 
about this claim. This is because even if the missile defense system can be categorized as 
a defensive military means, the cooperation of the U.S.-Japanese TMD system strongly 
intensified the Chinese doubts. As Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler propose about the 
ambivalent nature of weapons, “a gun can be the source of food for a family in a hunting 
community, or it can be used to spray bullets across a school in a mad killing.”181 In 
other words, there hardly exists an absolute standard to divide weapons into categories of 
offensive and defensive tools in international politics. Applying this logic, Chinese 
scholar Yan Xuetong argues that, “the TMD can be a component of a larger offensive 
weapons system” because the TMD’s inherent technological capabilities and the military 
missions for which it might be used.182 He points out that TMD is highly likely to be 
seen as offensive when it is deployed abroad to protect U.S. forward-deployed troops, 
which could be used for offensive purposes.183 Moreover, for TMD’s technological side, 
due to the fact that achievements in research and development of TMD would be 
transferred to ballistic missile technology, Beijing is more likely to regard it as a 
threatening military weapon.   
Fourth, states underscore other states’ aggressive intentions as well other states’ 
military capabilities. Walt maintains that the characteristic of states’ accumulated 
behavior determines their distinctive perceived intentions. For example, the Soviet 
Union’s Afghanistan invasion, periodic interventions in Eastern Europe, and successful 
attack on a Korean airliner reinforced suspicions of its aggressive intentions. In this 
                                                 
181 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in 
World Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 43. 
182 Yan Xuetong, “Viewpoint: Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security,” The 
Nonproliferation Review (1999): 66. 
183 Ibid. 
 72
context, China acutely felt that Washington had an aggressive intention against Sino-
Taiwan unification after the Clinton administration deployed its aircraft carriers to the 
Taiwan Strait in March 1996. Moreover, continued territorial disputes with Japan over 
the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands provide fertile ground for the Chinese doubts.  
Taken together, these four variables of balance of threat theory determine why 
China regarded the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a potential threat (see 
Table 5). For Beijing, signing the NDG increased the U.S.-Japanese aggregated power 
and convinced China that the U.S. and Japan strove to increase their offensive power, 
especially through the TMD, as the result of aggressive intentions. Moreover, the 
refinement of the U.S. and Japanese logistical support activities and joint operation 
system potentially strengthened the efficiency of the U.S. military bases in Japan. In other 
words, the U.S. could not only dispatch its troops to any disputed region of East Asia as 
soon as possible, but also efficiently use the Japanese assets for supporting its military 
operations. Therefore, the NDG compelled China to view the U.S. military capabilities as 
a nearby threat.     











+ + (Potentially) + + 
 
Walt’s balance of threat theory explains far more than Waltz’s balance of power 
theory, which solely focuses on the power aggregation of other states or coalitions. As a 
result, Walt’s theoretical explanation can deduce that the Chinese perception of a threat, 
which came from the interlinking of Walt’s four variables, led Beijing to strive to balance 
against threats that the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance triggers. However, the next 
section discusses why Walt’s explanation, although better, is still not enough. 
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2. The Insufficiency of the Balance of Threat Theory to Explain the 
Chinese Perception of Japan’s Aggressiveness 
The Chinese perception of the aggressive intention of the NDG represents the 
subjective and psychological realm in contrast to measurable variables, such as the 
aggregated power of the U.S. and Japan, geographic proximity, and offensive power. As 
Walt maintains, states can deduce other states’ intentions from the others’ accumulated 
behavior. For example, if one state increases aggressive capabilities, has periodically 
invaded other states, or deploys intermediate-raged nuclear missiles in the area of a 
border line, an adversary state is likely to perceive that the state has an aggressive 
intention.   
To determine whether Tokyo had aggressive intentions in signing the new NDG, 
one must first historically analyze Japanese behavior. In fact, the Prime Minister of Japan, 
Yosida Shigeru (1946–1947 and 1948–1954), had focused on economic recovery and 
development while avoiding the large-scale costs of defense since the 1952 San Francisco 
Peace treaty. In tandem with these political and economic benefits after the United States 
and Japan signed the first security treaty, Japan’s economy-first policy strongly 
influenced its foreign and security policies for the next 20 years. Furthermore, despite the 
shifting bipolar global power structure of the early 1990s, Japan did not change its overall 
policy trends. Given the strong collaborating and burden-sharing with Washington on 
security and upholding of the 1 percent norm of the defense budget, Tokyo’s general 
security strategy had not changed since the end of World War II (see Figure 7).  
According to Figure 7, Japan has persistently maintained its military expenditure 
at 1 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP); on the other hand, China in the Mao 
era (1962–1976) spent about 16–28 percent of its GNP on military expenditure. 
Furthermore, even though the economy-first policy of the Deng government (1976–1989) 
decreased China’s military budgets from the level of 16 percent to 2 percent of its GNP, 
Beijing’s military spending of its GNP always overwhelmed the level of Tokyo’s. The 
evidence of China and Japan’s military expenditure is sufficient to discredit Walt’s logic 
that a state’s aggressive behaviors can reinforce another’s suspicion about its hostile 
intentions. As Figure 7 shows, China was unlikely to perceive the NDG as the outcome 
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of Japan’s aggressiveness given Tokyo’s adherence to the low level of military 
expenditures.   
 
Figure 7.  Military expenditure share of China and Japan’s GNP.184185 
Some Chinese analysts may argue that even though the Japanese defense budget 
maintained 1 percent of GNP, the amount of military spending in 1997 was very high as 
the world’s third biggest country.186 In fact, Japan continued to increase its military 
budget since 1970s. Nevertheless, as Chapter II determined, until joining the NDG, 
Tokyo was unprepared and reluctant to contribute to global security; successive Japanese 
governments portrayed its security policy as “defensive defense.” 187  Furthermore, 
Samuels ascribes the continuous increase of the Japanese military budget since 1970s to 
the persistent U.S. pressure on Japan to spend more on defense.188 In this context, the 
1977 statement of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (1976–1978) that “Japan would 
contribute to regional security by economic and diplomatic means only” exemplifies the 
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mainstream of Japanese security perspective at that time.189 Moreover, even though 
Japan was the third largest defense spender and possessed the most modern military force 
in Asia, its defense spending was inevitably restrained from the United States—especially 
when Tokyo demanded for power projection capabilities.190 Taken together, one can 
conclude that the evidence of Tokyo’s continued increases in military budgets, and their 
absolute size, is insufficient to correlate with Japanese aggressiveness. 
Analyzing the trend of military budget between China and Japan provides a 
further convincing result that the genuinely aggressive country lately has been China (see 
Figure 8). Even though Japan was spending approximately 2.5 times as much as China in 
the late-1980s, the rapid growth in China’s military budget gradually decreased the gap of 
these two countries’ military spending. China surpassed Japan in 2004 and is recently 
spending about 3–4 times as much as Japan. The reversal of the ratio of Sino-Japanese 
military spending in this period indicate that it China, not Japan, whose aggressive 
intentions have been growing. 
 
Figure 8.  Military expenditures of China and Japan.191 
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Japanese security behavior since the end of World War II has not revealed 
consistently aggressive intentions. Therefore, one must attribute Beijing’s perception of 
Tokyo’s aggressive intentions to more lengthy Sino-Japanese relations. In this context, 
Walt’s assumption that a state can recognize other states’ intentions from accumulated 
behavior is questionable in four aspects.  
First, Walt neglects the possibility that states’ mutual cognitions, which have been 
accumulated for a long time by intersubjective processes, contribute to a state’s 
perception of other states’ intentions. For example, Canada’s existing cognition of the 
U.S. is reflected in the long historical intersubjective outcome. Canada does not regard 
the U.S. as a security threat, in spite of the extraordinary arms build-up and formidable 
power projection capability of the U.S., because the United States does not behave 
threateningly toward Canada, and because Canada trusts that the friendly relationship is 
enduring. This logic differs from Walt’s. Walt just focuses on material aggressiveness, 
which can be shown in a visible component, such as the state’s military expenditure 
increase and military forward deployment. With Walt’s logic, one state’s military 
reinforcement and aggressive military doctrine must induce other state’s threat perception. 
However, as the U.S.-Canada relationships shows, real international politics historically 
has shown that Walt’s logic is incomplete. In short, if state A has a positive cognition to 
State B, the former, like Canada, is less likely to regard the latter’s material power 
development, like the U.S., as a threat.  
Second, Walt disregards that the sphere of international politics frequently 
requires states to judge ambivalent and ambiguous phenomena. He explains that states 
perceived the Soviet’s aggressive intentions not only by Stalin’s coercive statements and 
emphasis on offensive military forces, but also through the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Certainly, this Soviet behavior sufficiently provided a fertile ground for perceiving 
Stalin’s aggressive intentions. Furthermore, the Cold War’s dichotomous bipolar system 
between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc helped far more states distinguish whether certain 
another state’s behavior was the outcome of aggressive intentions. However, the advent 
of various key actors in East Asia—the U.S., China, Japan, and South and North Korea—
makes states’ judgment of others more difficult.  
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Third, with the multilateral security environment of East Asia, states must analyze 
a number of complicated variables. For this reason, a state’s intention is less likely to be 
objectively interpreted, and more likely to be swayed by the other states’ accumulated 
perception of the state. In short, even if state A’s intention reflects in its behavior, as Walt 
argues, the other states’ evaluation of A’s behavior varies depending on each state’s 
accumulated perception of state A.     
Fourth, as Peter J. Katzenstein argues, “the threat perception of enemies is an 
explanatory variable that does not offer a compelling answer as much as it invites further 
investigation.”192 Even if Walt’s balance of threat theory is based on a neorealist style 
analysis, he pushes beyond rationalist styles of analysis. Furthermore, Katzenstein points 
out that Walt moves a large distance from material capabilities to ideational factors.193 In 
other words, Walt’s theory loses credibility because his ambivalent approach tries to 
analyze an ideological and psychological component through a neorealist perspective. He 
finally fails to present how a threat perception—an ideational variable—can be measured. 
For that reason, the effect of inter-states’ collective identity and interest is an important 
ingredient to overcome the insufficiency of Walt’s theory.  
Therefore, to supplement Walt’s argument, the theory of constructivist scholars 
Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf will be examined. Wendt and Hopf assume that one 
state’s perception of another state depends on its accumulated national identity and 
interest, which is a useful theoretical approach. This argument sufficiently provides a 
persuasive explanation of why Beijing perceived the NDG as the outcome of Japanese 
aggressive intentions, despite the fact that Japan had not shown hostile intentions since 
the end of World War II.  
The analysis of the causal relationships between Sino-Japanese historical legacies 
and the Chinese perceptions of Japan reinforces the useful aspects of Walt’s theory. As 
Christensen points out, the Sino-Japanese “historical legacies and ethnic hatred” strongly 
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exacerbate their security dilemma.194 Moreover, given that U.S.-Japanese TMD can be 
categorized as a defensive military means (despite Chinese, such as Yan Xuetong above, 
who may interpret it as an offensive system), the realist perspective alone is still 
problematic as a way to analyze this issue. Hence, it is essential to determine Sino-
Japanese historical relations to supplement Walt’s theoretical insufficiency. 
The last part of this chapter demonstrates that Sino-Japanese historical legacies 
had formed China’s negative perceptions of Japan, which led them to regard the NDG as 
a threat. Therefore, the following section describes how these historical legacies reflect 
the negative Chinese view of Japan and why this Chinese hatred exacerbates the Sino-
Japanese security dilemma. In this context, Wendt’s and Hopf’s constructivist 
perspectives provide a convincing explanation to determine how the Sino-Japanese 
historical legacies have helped build Chinese identities and interests in the region. 
B. CONSTRUCTIVISM PERSPECTIVE ON THE CHINESE PERCEPTION 
OF JAPANESE AGGRESSIVENESS 
As Alexander Wendt argues, international politics is also the outcome of social 
relationships.195 Furthermore, he points out that “shared knowledge, material resources, 
and practices” are the main elements of social structures. 196  In terms of security 
dilemmas, Wendt maintains that states’ perceptions, which come from the intersubjective 
process, intensifies, or alleviates it. Therefore, Wendt assumes that the result of negative 
intersubjective cognition between states is more prone to security dilemmas.  
Wendt attributes security dilemmas to a “situated activity” not given by anarchy 
or nature. 197  Wendt’s logic contests the realist perspective, in which an anarchic 
international structure encourages states’ self-help and efforts to survive. Yet, putting 
aside the debate of these two contrasting theoretical perspectives in the Sino-Japanese 
security dilemma, the main objective of this chapter is to determine why Beijing believed 
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that Tokyo had aggressive intentions despite the fact that Japan had not shown an 
expansionist foreign policy since the end of World War II. As a result, this added 
constructivist approach can support Walt’s insufficient explanation for why China 
perceived Japan as a threat.    
1. Sino-Japanese Historical Legacies 
As Allen S. Whiting argues, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 remains a historic 
benchmark in Chinese perceptions of Japan because China suffered its first loss of 
territory in modern times as “a result of military defeat.”198 He also points out that 
Tokyo’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931–1932 and its ferocious invasion of 1937–1945, 
especially the Japanese atrocities committed against the Chinese inhabitants, have left 
bitter memories in the populace.199  According to China’s Response to the West: A 
documentary Survey (1839–1923), the Japanese military forces continually overran 
China’s main industrial areas and killed millions of Chinese people from 1894 to 
1945.200 For those reasons, Chinese memories of the past have been an obstacle to 
maintaining a close relationship with Japan and manifested, on occasion, in the 
ventilation of Chinese private or public animosity. 
China and Japan have contrasting attitudes to the 1937–1945 Japanese invasions. 
In fact, the Japanese atrocities, which included the Nanjing Massacre, have been 
repeatedly recalled in China but ignored or deemphasized in Japan. This is a critical 
element that impacts the negative Chinese relationship with Japan. Given the intense 
Chinese antagonism against continued Japanese attempts to revise historical records and 
textbooks, the cognition of these two countries in the history of bilateral relations is 
substantially different. Moreover, in September 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro’s tribute to the Japanese fallen soldiers in the Yasukuni Shrine incited 
thousands of Chinese university students to publicly demonstrate against the importation 
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of the Japanese economic system in China. 201  Hence, the Chinese, regardless of 
generation, have a strong antipathy to its wartime suffering and the Japanese efforts to 
dilute historical wrongs without self-reflection.  
As Whiting points out, the term image, which refers to “the preconceived 
stereotype of a nation, state, or people that is derived from a selective interpretation of 
history, experience, and self-image,” strongly influences the mind of the decision makers 
for coping with foreign phenomena.202 In this context, the Japanese Nanjing Massacre, in 
which approximately “340,000 Chinese people died, 190,000 in group massacres and 
150,000 in individual murders,” contributed to forming the Chinese perception of the 
worst images of Japan. 203  This historical Chinese bitterness constantly has been 
transmitted to younger generations by not only personal accounts, but also the mass 
media. Hence, the negative Japanese image, which has been accumulating in China since 
the occupation of Manchuria, directly and indirectly impacts Beijing’s decision making. 
2. China’s Negative Image of Japan 
The following section evaluates whether the negative Japanese image is indeed 
reflected in various levels of social opinion in China. If the negative Chinese cognition of 
Japan exists, one can use it to supplement Walt’s theory in the Sino-Japanese security 
dilemma. If the Chinese have a collective notion that Japan is aggressive, this image of 
Japan is likely to affect Beijing’s threat perception of the NDG as the outcome of 
Tokyo’s expansionism.   
The profound Chinese distrust and negative perception of Japan, which have been 
accumulating since the brutal Japanese invasions of 1894–1945, is reflected in various 
fields. Therefore, as Wendt argues, these negative perceptions can build Chinese 
identities and interests that lead them to interpret and predict Japanese behaviors.  
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a. Perceptions of the General Public 
According to “Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another,” a 
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center of 2,180 Chinese adults in 2006, many 
Chinese had a strong negative perception of Japan. The research found that 71 percent of 
Chinese respondents had hostility toward Japan. 204  Furthermore, given the ratio of 
Chinese negative emotion to other Asian countries, the highest percentage of their 
negative feeling was directed toward Japan (see Table 6).  
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Favorable 94 28 47 69 
Unfavorable 5 71 39 7 
 
The Pew Research Center attributes these negative Chinese emotions to the 
unreflective Japanese stance on its past faults. For this reason, the Chinese and Japanese 
populations have greatly differing perceptions of the Japanese apologies for its military 
actions. As 81 percent of Chinese respondents believe, the Japanese apologies are 
unsufficient to soothe the victims of brutal persecution.206 In Japan, on the other hand, 40 
percent of respondents reply that they have apologized sufficiently for its military actions 
in World War II; even 14 percent of people answer that they don’t need to atone for them 
at all (see Figure 9).207 Therefore, the negative Chinese sentiments to Japan are rooted in 
historical legacies and have continued to be unresolved because of Beijing’s perception 
that Tokyo has not apologized sufficiently for its militaristic faults.   
 






Figure 9.  Different views on the Japanese apology for its military action.208 
As the 2006 survey of Pew Research Center indicates, only a small percent of 
Chinese interviewed have a positive attitude to Japan. Furthermore, Chinese regard the 
Japanese as competitive, greedy, and arrogant. Comparing the percentage of the Chinese 
respondents who vote for positive Japanese characteristics—honest (15 percent), 
generous (9 percent), and tolerant (22 percent), those who vote for the negative traits are 
much higher—competitive (74 percent), greedy (68 percent), and arrogant (69 percent) 
(see Figure 10). Therefore, one can deduce that a negative and hostile impression largely 
pervades the Chinese perception of Japan.  
 
Figure 10.  Chinese positive and negative views on the Japanese traits.209 




In another survey, Genron-NPO, a Japanese non-profit organization, interviewed 
1,609 Chinese individuals in 2007. The Chinese regarded Japan as the second most-
threatening country in the world (see Figure 11). 210  Furthermore, for the question 
“reasons why you feel Japan is a threat,” Japanese aggression, which was only 
experienced in the distant past, accounted for almost 62 percent. This was the highest 
percentage among the respondents’ answers (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11.  Chinese perception of military threatening countries.211 
 
Figure 12.  Chinese perception of the Japanese threatening factors.212 
                                                 





b. How Japan is Viewed in the Education of Chinese History  
After the Education Law was passed in 1995, the PRC has emphasized patriotic 
education by widely reminding its citizens of the stories of Japanese invasion forces. As 
Christopher W. Hughes points out, the Chinese students simultaneously learn about the 
importance of national security and Japanese brutality in the story named “Thought and 
Value,” in which one young boy was executed because he refused to betray his country to 
Japan. 213  Hughes also mentions that the younger Chinese generation directly and 
indirectly has been affected by these negative images of Japan. Furthermore, according to 
the investigation of David P. Janes, Chinese History Book I, used by 80 percent of 
Chinese middle schools, tends to be biased. For example, it allots the story of the Nanjing 
Massacre to a whole chapter. 214  It presents the cruelty of the Japanese army by 
highlighting their indelible faults during World War II. 
As Dune Lawrence and Bradley K. Martin maintain, a guide of the Chinese high-
school history textbooks published in 2004 included the idea that “Guarding against the 
revival of Japanese militarism and fascism remains one of the most important problems 
that we face.”215  Moreover, some scholars are concerned that the Chinese patriotic 
education strongly influences the younger generation’s “blind patriotism” and forms “the 
idea that their national security is threatened by external power, especially the U.S. and 
Japan.”216 In this regard, the younger Chinese generation, who is educated by the biased 
patriotic history education, is unable to hold balanced attitudes to Japan and is also more 
likely to perceive Japanese political activities as a national threat. In short, history 
education in China, which emphasizes Japanese brutality during World War II, 
contributes to the persistence of negative Japanese images in the China. 
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3. Why China Perceives Japan as Aggressive? 
China’s negative Japanese images shed the most light on why Beijing regarded 
the NDG as the outcome of Tokyo’s aggressive intentions. As a constructivist scholar, 
Wendt argues that state A’s interpretation of state B’s action is decided by state A’s 
identities.217 Moreover, the process of creating intersubjective meanings between states, 
by signaling, interpreting, and responding, makes both states hold certain ideas about 
each other. Finally, these “reciprocal typifications” create relatively stable concepts of 
self and other—identities—regarding the issue at stake in the interaction. Therefore, the 
reciprocal typifications of Sino-Japanese relations led Beijing to perceive the NDG as the 
outcome of Japan’s aggressiveness.  
As determined above, the Chinese public has negative images about Japan. These 
negative images result from the brutal Japanese exploitation of Chinese people and from 
the idea that Tokyo’s reflections on the war are insufficient. Moreover, the PRC’s 
education policy, which emphasizes the brutality of the Japanese army forces during 
World War II, continues to provoke anti-Japanese sentiments in the younger generations. 
For this reason, one can deduce that the Chinese, regardless of generation, have an 
unfavorable perception of Japan. As Wendt points out, these negative images are 
reflected in Beijing’s interpretation of Japanese behavior. 
With the negative perception of Japan, the strategic implication of the NDG—the 
reinforcement of Japanese security roles against regional conflicts—was sufficient to 
catalyze the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. China’s images of Japan converge on two 
aspects—an unfavorable state that has no introspection about its past faults, and a 
threatening state in which some people want to revive militarism. Therefore, Beijing 
interpreted the 1997 redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as evidence of the 
resurgence of Japanese militarism. Given the intense Chinese mistrust toward Japan, 
many Chinese judged that the NDG undermined the Japanese norms of self-restraint, 
which made Beijing feel that Tokyo strove to normalize its international security role and 
even revive militarism by signing the NDG.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has focused on the two questions of whether and why China regarded 
the NDG as a national threat. To answer the first question, the thesis categorizes Beijing’s 
responses to the NDG. The result of the analysis suggests that the Chinese efforts are 
categorized by two aspects: diplomatic and military reactions. As the Jervis’ action-
reaction process describes, the U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, which tried to 
strengthen their national security, conversely made China suspicious and led them to 
counteract the agreement in various fields. Given Tokyo’s action and Beijing’s reaction, 
these two states were sinking into the spiral model of a security dilemma. Hence, one can 
conclude that the NDG intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma even though the 
United States and Japan tried to redefine the limitations of their security alliance, which 
emerged during the early post-Cold War era.  
To answer the second question, this thesis uniquely combines two theoretical 
perspectives—Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat and Alexander Wendt’s constructivist 
theory. Taken together, Walt’s four independent variables—aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions— show much of why the NDG 
threatened the Beijing’s perception. First, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese security 
alliance implies that both states pledge to fight together against external aggressions. 
Therefore, the NDG could be an efficient and visible means to aggregate the security 
power of the U.S. and Japan; however, it is a serious threat to China, which is the major 
non-U.S. ally in East Asia that is also arguing with Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 
Second, the important strategic implication of the NDG is the fact that Japan agrees to 
provide active support for U.S. operations in the various disputes of East Asia. In other 
words, the NDG maximizes U.S. power and contributes to its unlimited freedom of action 
in East Asia. Hence, China fears that the U.S. can unrestrictedly intervene in its national 
interests—especially in Sino-Taiwan reunification and territorial disputes with Japan. 
Third, the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in developing a TMD system sufficiently intensifies 
Beijing’s perception of a threat. Given the strategic implications of a TMD—neutralizing 
the PLA’s nuclear power, protecting U.S. forward-deployed troops, and potentially 
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strengthening Taiwan’s defense capability—Chinese explicitly regard it as an offensive 
weapon despite of its defensive nature.  
However, Walt’s fourth variable, aggressive intentions, cannot persuasively 
explain why China perceived that the NDG was the outcome of Japanese aggressive 
intention. Given Tokyo’s constant collaboration and burden-sharing with the United 
States, as well as its adherence to the 1 percent norm of the defense budget, Japan has not 
revealed its aggressive intentions since the end of World War II. In contrast with Walt’s 
assumption that states can deduce other states’ intentions by their exposed behaviors, 
Tokyo’s political activities since the 1950s have been far from the aggressive.  
To supplement Walt’s logic in explaining the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, 
this research uses Alexander Wendt and Ted Hopf’s constructivist theory. According to 
this thesis, the Chinese public has intensely negative images of Japan. Moreover, the 
Chinese fear of a militarized Japan persists and affects Beijing’s negative interpretation 
of Tokyo’s reasons for signing the NDG. As a result, the combination of Walt and 
Wendt’s theoretical perspectives complementarily suggests why Beijing regarded the 
NDG as a national threat, which intensified the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.  
A. THE FUTURE OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
As the above literature review determined, each international relations theory 
presents a distinct argument regarding the nature of a state and the international system. 
For this reason, one can predict a different future of Sino-Japanese relations by applying 
these various theories. Yet, using a dichotomous approach in which one theory is correct 
and the other is incorrect is less likely to present a productive output. In this context, 
therefore, the different hypothesis of each international relations theory will complement 
each other to shed light on determining the future of Sino-Japanese relations.  
1. Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realist World 
With Mearsheimer’s offensive logic, China inevitably wants to dominate the East 
Asian region; therefore, Beijing will continue to increase its power to drive out the 
United States from Asia. In this context, the PLA will accelerate the development of 
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A2/AD capabilities, which efficiently prevent the U.S.-Japanese allied forces from 
interfering in Sino-Taiwan reunification and China’s territorial disputes. Given past 
actions of the U.S., which has shown intolerance to competitors, this theory suggests that 
the new Cold War is coming close.  
In the near future, China’s main national interest is to retrieve Taiwan. As 
Mearsheimer points out, Taiwan has an important strategic implication for controlling the 
sea lanes of East Asia. For this reason, maintaining the independent status of Taiwan is a 
significant goal for the U.S. East Asian strategy. This U.S. security policy is directly 
reflected in the fact that the NDG included contingencies about Taiwan. Considering 
Taiwan’s strategic importance, the conflicts between Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo 
over Taiwan will most likely trigger various levels of security competition—from low-
intensity to high-intensity conflicts.  
In the long term, other Asian neighbors of China—especially South Korea, India, 
Russia, and even Japan—will be forced to choose Beijing or Washington as its ally. In 
fact, many East Asian countries have worried not only about the rise of China since the 
early-1990s, but also whether the U.S.-led balancing coalition can efficiently contain 
China. As a result, based on Mearsheimer’s offensive logic, one can only predict that 
China and the U.S.-Japan alliance will collide to achieve an East Asian hegemony.       
2. Waltz and Walt’s Defensive Realist World 
In contrast, Waltz and Walt as defensive realist theorists argue that a state only 
strives to increase its internal and external capabilities for security. While the views of a 
defensive realist differ from those of an offensive realist on the nature of a state, these 
two branches of realism share the belief that states hardly believe others’ intentions in the 
anarchic international system. For this reason, security dilemmas always exist in 
international relations; their level fluctuates with the combination of various security 
variables. For example, as Jervis’ offensive-defensive balance theory points out, the 
combination of two variables—whether the offensive or the defensive means can provide 
an advantage and whether states can distinguish the offensive or the defensive posture of 
other states—can produce the four levels of a security dilemma.   
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With the defensive realist view, one hardly predicts the optimistic future of the 
Sino-Japanese relations. This is because the rise of China is sufficient to threaten the 
perception of security of the U.S. and Japan when applying Walt’s theory—China’s 
power aggregation, the geopolitical closeness in East Asia, the PLA’s modernization 
efforts, and Beijing’s determined stance on territorial disputes. Furthermore, the security 
dilemma’s zero-sum competition is already developed between China and the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. Beijing seems to regard the U.S.-Japanese cooperation over the TMD system as 
a military means for preventing Sino-Taiwan reunification. As this thesis determined, 
China further increased diplomatic and military reactions against it. In other words, a new 
arms race between China and the United States is accelerating, like the one between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Based on this evidence, one can expect that if the 
United States and China persist in this zero-sum game, they will inevitably begin a new 
Cold War era.  
3. Wendt’s Constructivist World  
Wendt’s theory somewhat shares a defensive realist view of the world, especially 
regarding the existence of security dilemmas in the anarchic international system. Yet, to 
be more exact, Wendt combines the social concept, in which intersubjective processes 
form states’ identities and interests, with the neorealism’s main argument that the 
international system has an anarchic structure. Given that the concept of a security 
dilemma is based on the essential hypothesis of a defensive realism, in which states’ 
efforts to protect their security force them to sink into a spiral model, this logic indirectly 
reflects Wendt’s idea that intersubjective processes affect the intensity of the security 
dilemma.  
On the basis of Wendt’s logic, one can deduce that the future Sino-Japanese 
relations will depend on whether China and Japan will resolve their bitter historical 
legacies. Nevertheless, given not only Beijing’s attempt to link the territorial disputes 
over the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands with the revival of Japanese expansionism, but also 
Tokyo’s ignorance of their militaristic faults, a pessimistic outcome is more likely.  
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Although Wendt’s perspective is efficient to analyze the causal relationships over 
past and present international politics, it is an insufficient theoretical tool to predict the 
future. According to Wendt’s logic based on psychological and sociological realm, one 
can conclude that certain people’s identities could directly affect national policy, which 
would inevitably influence international relations. For example, as Wendt argues, 
Gorbachev’s rethinking changed the Soviet Union’s identities and interests and 
consequently changed those of the United States. With this logic, one cannot predict the 
future, because it is impossible to know who will be a national leader. Hence, Wendt’s 
constructivist view presents an insufficient basis for prediction about the future of Sino-
Japanese relations.  
B. THE COMBINATION OF WALT AND WENDT’S LOGIC 
By applying the combined approach of realism and constructivism to the issues 
that a unilateral view alone cannot sufficiently determine, one obtains a further 
convincing theoretical tool. In this context, this thesis presents the revised model that 
persuasively explains why a state feels an adversary’s actions as a threat and which 
elements can determine the size of a perceived threat.   
1. Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory Revised 
As mentioned above, both Walt and Wendt’s theories are partially insufficient to 
explain the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. For example, even though Walt argues that 
the aggressive intention can be shown by a state’s behaviors, China’s negative images of 
Japan, which intersubjective historical interactions had accumulated, led them to view 
Tokyo’s action as an outcome of aggressive intentions. In addition, Wendt’s logic, which 
combines a psychological and sociological concept with the neorealism’s anarchic 
structure, lacks logical coherence and cannot provide a persuasive explanation regarding 
the future of Sino-Japanese relations.  
Despite Wendt’s lack of future predictability, his constructivist perspective 
effectively supplements Walt’s theory. This research already verified that the combined 
theoretical tool provides a better explanation for the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. As 
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the case of Sino-Japanese relations determined, state A’s images of state B directly affect 
state A’s perception of whether state B’s actions are aggressive. Of course, as Walt 
argues, the visible evidence, such as the increase of military expenditure and offensive 
capabilities or the deployment of offensive missiles along a border line, also lead states to 
regard actions as the outcome of aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, given that Beijing 
feared the revival of Japanese remilitarism despite Tokyo’s continuation of the 1 percent 
norm of defense expenditure, one can conclude that the image of a state takes priority 
over its visible actions. 
2. The Importance of Images on the Perception of Aggressive Intentions 
Given the causal relationships between the NDG and Beijing’s threat perception, 
China’s perceived image of Japan was one of factors that led China to interpret the 
strategic objective of the NDG as aggressive. Of course, the possibilities that the NDG 
may disrupt Sino-Taiwan unification and contain the rise of China significantly affected 
Beijing’s perception that the U.S.-Japan alliance represents aggressive intentions. 
Nevertheless, this research demonstrates that intersubjective processes produce an image 
of states; it can be an essential factor, which directly influences one state’s interpretation 
of another state’s action.  
Another essential implication of this thesis is that the images of a state can 
directly increase the level of perceived aggressive intentions. As Beijing’s attitude to the 
NDG showed, the Chinese hatred of Japan, in fact, provided fertile ground for the 
possibility that the NDG may cause a remilitarized Japan. The Chinese negative images 
of Japan, which come from the brutal Japanese behavior during World War II, made them 
view the NDG as the outcome of Tokyo’s aggressive ambition.  
The Chinese government had a relevant catalyst to remind the public about 
Tokyo’s aggressiveness, for it combined the hostile images of Japan with the extension of 
the SDF’s security role from the NDG. As a result, Beijing efficiently achieved a shift in 
its policies concerning the disputes of Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands with Japan. For this 
reason, since the mid-1990s, China drastically increased its vehement objections to the 
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Japanese Prime Ministers’ Yasukuni Shrine visits in order to highlight Japanese 
aggressiveness.  
3. A Case Study: South Korean and Japanese Relations 
The combined perspectives of Walt and Wendt can also persuasively explain why 
South Korea strongly opposes Japan’s attempt to legislate its collective right to self-
defense. With Walt’s balance of threat theory, South Korea, as a U.S. ally, should hope 
that Japan sends its Self-Defense Forces to protect an external aggression—especially a 
threat from North Korea. In other words, South Korea, which directly confronts North 
Korea’s threatening military capabilities, should require Japan’s pledge that the SDF will 
engage in a South Korean crisis to contain the North’s hostility. Nevertheless, the general 
public strongly disagrees with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to reinterpret and 
reform Japan’s constitution for exercising its collective self-defense right.  
Considering Walt’s logic—a state will likely endeavor to protect its security in an 
anarchic system—the Park administration’s diplomatic action is somewhat questionable. 
If Japan recognizes the right to exercise collective self-defense, it can act as a strong 
deterrent to a North Korean threat. Furthermore, in the basic concept of an alliance 
system, allies have a mutual responsibility to defend each other, which means that Japan 
must provide South Korea with military support if war breaks out on the Korean 
Peninsula. Despite this promise of Japanese support to balance against the Kim Jong-Un 
regime, Seoul regards Tokyo’s actions as the outcome of aggressive intentions. 
In terms of Seoul’s questionable reaction, Walt’s balance of threat theory, revised 
with Wendt’s theory, sheds the most light on the essential reason for the Park 
administration’s perception of a threat. Like China, a deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment 
over Japan’s colonialism persists in South Korean. In this context, Japan’s brutality 
during World War II, where Japanese military forces used South Korean women as 
wartime sex slaves, contributed to the negative South Korean perception of Japan. The 
older South Koreans have constantly transmitted this historical bitterness to younger 
generations, not only through personal accounts, but also through the mass media. For 
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this reason, Japan has negative image that directly and indirectly impacts South Korea’s 
security decision making. 
The combination of the negative images of Japan and the strategic implication of 
Japan’s self-defense right, in which Japan reinforced its security roles against regional 
conflicts, was sufficient to catalyze the Park administration’s threat perception. Like 
China, South Korea’s images of Japan also converge on two aspects—an unfavorable 
state that has no introspection about its past faults, and a threatening state in which some 
people want to revive militarism. Therefore, Seoul interpreted the political gesture of 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to exercise its self-defense right as a symbol of the 
resurgence of Japanese militarism. The combination of South Korea’s intense mistrust of 
Japan and fear about the weaker Japanese norms of self-restraint led to its perception that 
Tokyo strove to normalize its international security role and even revive militarism.  
As the analysis of Sino-Japanese relations determined, the negative Japanese 
images of South Korea also lead them to perceive Tokyo’s actions as a threat despite the 
fact that these actions are likely to act as an efficient deterrent to the North. Therefore, 
this demonstrates that an accumulated image of a state directly affects an adversary’s 
interpretation of that state’s action. Furthermore, a state’s image is one of the most 
important variables when analyzing East Asian relations, where the bitter memory of the 
brutal Japanese behavior during World War II persists. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE HARMONY 
One can also deduce important suggestions for the future of Sino-Japanese 
harmony from this research. To alleviate the Sino-Japanese security dilemma, states must 
strive to mutually shape their positive images by interacting with each other. Examples of 
interaction would include increasing economic interdependence, continuing a positive 
dialogue on a historical problem, and, in the long term, organizing the Asian political 
community like the European Union. Among these options for interaction, the most 
primary effort must be to settle historical problems.  
For a settlement of historical hostilities, it is essential that Japan endeavors to 
establish a sense of trust by apologizing for its war crimes and colonialism. Until Tokyo 
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sincerely shows a reflective attitude over its faults of imperialism, the Chinese public is 
likely to continually doubt Japan’s behavior. Moreover, without the ability to trust 
Japan’s intentions, Beijing will continue to fear Tokyo’s aggressiveness and remilitarism, 
which will be an essential obstruction to joint security cooperation. Nevertheless, given 
current Chinese intense antagonism toward Tokyo’s continued attempts to revise 
historical records and textbooks, the reconciliation with Japan seems to be a long and 
rough journey.  
To reconcile Japan with China regarding historical problems, a positive approach 
from China and Japan’s leaders will be essential. As the drastic increase of China’s 
condemnation of the Yasukuni visits since mid-1990s shows, the public’s nationalist 
passion can be soothed or fueled depending on the government’s actions. For this reason, 
if Chinese or Japanese leaders are willing to interact with each other, the national 
consensus for reconciliation can be easily made. For both sides, Beijing must forgive the 
old Japanese faults and Tokyo must apologize for its past crimes.   
Finally, Walt’s balance of threat theory also suggests that the only way to 
alleviate the Sino-Japanese security dilemma is to shape their mutual positive images of 
each other. The reasons that support this claim are as follows. First, the rise of China 
means an increase in its aggregation power; therefore, the U.S.-Japanese alliance must 
seek a way to balance against an increasing threat. Given the lack of U.S. economic 
power, the United States will continue to increase the Japanese SDF’s role; this 
conversely catalyzes China’s reaction. Hence, the rise of China is inevitably one of 
catalytic factors that can intensify the Sino-Japanese security dilemma. Second, the 
geopolitical closeness between China and Japan makes both countries more sensitive to 
external threats. Furthermore, the overlap of both countries’ maritime interests—
including the Senkakus/Diaoyutai islands—will likely become a major trigger of a 
military collision. Third, as the evidence of the U.S.-Japanese cooperation in developing 
the TMD and China’s ferocious opposition shows, it is impossible to distinguish between 
offensive and defensive weapons because most weapons system can be used offensively 
and defensively. This means that Beijing or Tokyo feel threatened and react against the 
development of an adversary’s weapon system, regardless of the type of weapons system.  
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Beijing and Tokyo can shed light on their harmonious relations by trying to shape 
positive mutual images. As determined above, visible elements as well as invisible 
factors like the images of a state, directly affect the final source of a threat— perceived 
intentions. However, Beijing’s fears of Japan’s remilitarism despite Tokyo’s upholding 
its 1 percent norm of the defense budget indicate how the image of a state takes priority 
over the visible elements. For this reason, one can conclude that if China and Japan 
endeavor to establish mutual positive images by maintaining various channels of 
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